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THE STRANGE PAIRING: BUILDING
ALLIANCES BETWEEN QUEER ACTIVISTS
AND CONSERVATIVE GROUPS TO
RECOGNIZE NEW FAMILIES
Nausica Palazzo*
Abstract
This Article explores some of the legal initiatives and reforms that
opponents of same-sex marriage in Canada and the United
States have pushed forward. Despite being animated by a desire
to dilute the protections for same-sex couples, these reforms
resulted in “queering” family law, in the sense that they
functionalized the notion of family. Consequently, two
cohabiting relatives or friends would be eligible for legal
recognition, along with all the public and private benefits of such
recognition. I term these kinds of “unions” and other nonnormative relationships to be “new families.”
The central claim of this Article is thus that new families should
build alliances with conservative fringe groups and capitalize on
their common interest in creating legal alternatives to marriage.
Section I of the Article will provide a primer on the legal
remedies available to non-normative relationships. Section II
will engage in a comparative analysis of conservative reforms in
the United States and Canada that ended up extending
eligibility requirements to new families, or that, although
currently restricted to conjugal couples, could constitute a viable
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model for protecting all new families, if their eligibility
requirements were amended. Section III tries to operationalize
legal recognition by analyzing the potential paths to gain it. I
will first anticipate and respond to criticism surrounding
recognition of new families, and then will lay the foundation for
rethinking queer activists’ political action. I will then offer some
recommendations (a) on the best model for implementation and
(b) on forming alliances with conservative groups.
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Introduction
The rate of marriage has been falling in Western countries for the
1
last few decades, but the level of care and commitment among individuals in relationships has by no means diminished. Instead, people are
investing economically and emotionally in relationships which do not
2
resemble the nuclear, romantic, dyadic, heterosexual family. I will call
these non-marital relationships “new families.” New family unions can
include (but are not limited to) unmarried conjugal couples, queer as3
semblies, polyamorous relationships, siblings, friends, and relatives.
Each unit of two or more people is a family union. Individuals belonging to them are economically and emotionally interdependent and
live “familyhood”—but often in ways that challenge traditional notions
of family and conjugality. Consider, for example, siblings who decide to
1. This is true in a number of Western countries, including Canada, the U.S., the U.K.,
and Italy. As to Canada, see JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN
FAMILY LAW 2 (6th ed. 2015). As to the U.S., see HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY 528 (Gary W. Peterson & Kevin R. Bush eds., 2013). As to England
and Wales, see Claire Miller, Number of People Getting Married is Falling—and Here’s
the Reason Why, MIRROR ONLINE (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.mirror.co.uk/
lifestyle/sex-relationships/number-people-getting-married-falling-7844282. As to Italy, see Matrimoni, Separazioni e Divorzi, ISTAT (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.istat.it/
it/files/2016/11/matrimoni-separazioni-divorzi2015.pdf?title=Matrimoni%2C+separazioni+e+divorzi+-+14%2Fnov%2F2016++Testo+integrale.pdf%20(last%20visited%20Jul%2029,%202017).
2. See Lois Harder, The State and the Friendships of the Nation: The Case of Nonconjugal
Relationships in the United States and Canada, 34 J. WOMEN CULT. & SOC’Y 633,
639 (2009). See also Fiona Williams, RETHINKING FAMILIES 48 (2004) (interpreting
the increasing diversity in households “as a part of a ‘queering’ of heterosexual relationships”).
3. The term “conjugal” is a synonym with sexual relationships, and is used here to contrast relationships that lack a sexual component. The I use this term intentionally because of the complexity it has inherited from interpretation by courts in common law
countries. But conjugality can mean slightly different things in different places. For
instance, Canadian courts consider sex to be an unnecessary component of a conjugal
relationship. See infra Section II.B.
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emotionally and financially support each other long-term in a new family arrangement. They are not conjugal, in the sense that they are not in
4
a romantic or sexual relationship, and therefore, they do not share a
fundamental feature of the archetypal married couple, but they do care
for each other deeply over the course of their lives. Should financial or
emotional problems arise, they will be there for each other. They might
live under the same roof, not only to capitalize on economies of scale,
but also because when they are home, they recognize each other as family.
The idea of “family” should be defined functionally. This is echoed
in the definition provided by the American Home Association (“AHA”)
in 1973. According to the AHA, a “family” is a union of:
[T]wo or more people who share resources, share
responsibility for decisions, share values and goals, and have
commitments to one another over time. The family is that
climate that one ‘comes home to’ and it is the network of
sharing and commitments that most accurately describes the
family units, regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption or
5
marriage.
New family forms are “queer” in the sense that they subvert the
6
pre-arranged and state-approved “proper way of living” familyhood.
The state’s promotion of “proper” familyhood—the heterosexual
nuclear family—is a means of ordering society. The “proper” family has
the same characteristics as any large system of ordering, whether
political, economic, social, or literary, in that it endeavors to preserve its
7
apparent seamlessness at any cost. These systems accomplish their
appearance of uninterrupted continuity in a variety of ways, including
8
by concealing disruptive information and exercising disciplinary

4. Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 294–300 (2001).
5. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 33 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Carla A. Pfeffer, QUEERING FAMILIES: THE POSTMODERN PARTNERSHIPS OF
CISGENDER WOMEN AND TRANSGENDER MEN (2016) (surveying one example of a
queer family: that of cisgender women partners of transgender men).
7. Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College of France,
1975-1976, at 7–8, 179–80 (Bauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana trans., 2003); see
also EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990).
8. Marvin J. Taylor, Queer Things from Old Closets: Libraries—Gay and Lesbian Studies—Queer Theory, 8 RARE BOOKS & MANUSCRIPTS LIBRARIANSHIP 21, 22–23
(1993).
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9

power. Silencing potentially disruptive knowledge is a condition for the
very existence of any such system.
By contrast, queering a system calls attention to deviance, and ex10
poses a system’s fissures, ruptures, and biases. This is achieved through
11
individual experience that deviates from proscribed steps. Since queering a system undermines that system’s ability to appear seamless, the
state has an interest in preserving normative families and hiding any disruptive knowledge, including anything concerning non-traditional family forms. This interest is effectuated through explicit state policies, such
as laws that channel people into marriage, and by other, subtler social
norms, such as regarding individuals who do not marry as social outcasts.
Bearing in mind this alternate vision for the family, this Article will
explore some of the legal initiatives and reforms that opponents of samesex marriage in the U.S. and Canada pushed. The schemes were
designed to shift the focus away from marriage equality for LGBT
couples and thereby attenuate the expressive benefits of legal recognition
12
for all eligible couples. These initiatives and reforms expanded many
protections and benefits for non-married couples. Of course, the
reforms were fundamentally conservative because they were—and still
are—animated by a desire to “circumvent stronger legal status for same13
sex relationships.” But, ironically and unwittingly, these reforms and
proposals have resulted in something much closer to a “queer” vision of
family law.
Many socially conservative proposals functionalized the notion of
family to the point of including cohabiting relatives and/or friends—
although not assemblies comprised of more than two adults. Consider,
for example, the reciprocal or designated beneficiary schemes that have
been introduced in the United States. Under a designated beneficiary
scheme, a person can designate a non-spouse (even a sibling) to be the
beneficiary of some public or private law entitlements.
Likewise, some religious groups in Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana have shown an interest in legalizing alternative family regimes, such

9. The core disciplinary powers are hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and
examination. Foucault, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES xx-xxi (1973).
12. The phrase “expressive benefits of recognition” refers to the state and social approval
of the union. Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 671–72
(2010).
13. Harder, supra note 2, at 648.
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14

as “covenant” marriages. A similar pattern can be found in Alberta,
15
Canada, where the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (AIRA)
16
was driven by similar conservative motives. Again, the irony is that
such schemes, despite being touted by ultra-conservative organizations
or political parties, have resulted in a dramatic pluralization of family
17
law regimes. The introduction of alternative schemes for protecting
partnerships—to live alongside traditional marriage—produced a shift
in favor of the unexplored land of the non-romantic, non-conjugal, or
18
otherwise non-traditional family.
The central claim of this Article is that new families should build
alliances with conservative fringe groups and capitalize on their common interest in creating legal alternatives to marriage. While this might
seem counterintuitive, many of these initiatives hold promise for queer
activists. Despite differing motives, the pluralization of family forms
pushed forward by conservatives aligns with queer activists’ interest in
opposing the state’s hegemonic and normalizing power.
By contrast, expanding access to traditional marriage holds limited
19
potential for non-normative families. I believe that marriage is not a
14. COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (John Witte Jr. & Eliza Ellison eds., 2005) (describing covenant marriages as special forms of marriage requiring premarital counseling and tighter requirements on divorce); see Steven L. Nock,
Laura A. Sanchez & James D. Wright, COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE MOVEMENT TO
RECLAIM TRADITION IN AMERICA 1–4 (2008) (defining covenant marriages as a variant on traditional marriages but with extra requirements, such as premarital counseling and acceptance of divorce in only limited circumstances, such as adultery, domestic abuse, or a prolonged separation. At present, Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana are
the only three states recognizing this form of “entrenched” marriage).
15. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5 (Can.).
16. Harder, supra note 2, at 646. The United Kingdom also had a very prominent legislative debate surrounding the Civil Partnership Act of 2004. See Nicola J. Barker, Why
Care? ‘Deserving Family Members’ and the Conservative Movement for Broader Family
Recognition, in VULNERABILITIES, CARE AND FAMILY LAW 59 (Julie Wallbank & Jonathan Herring eds., 2014). Baroness Ruth Deech’s proposed amendment to the Civil
Partnership Act of 2004 would have expanded the status of civil partners to siblings
and grandparents by replacing the phrase “sexual nuclear family” with the phrase “deserving family member.” Id. After being approved by the House of Lords, however,
the House of Commons rejected it. Id. Interestingly, once again, the reasons behind
its introduction were overt hostility toward same-sex marriage and homophobia:
statements like “once you recognize same-sex couples, why not two siblings?” were
made with a clear intent to denigrate the former. Id.
17. Pluralization of family law regimes refers to the introduction of different regimes
alongside traditional marriage.
18. Harder, supra note 2, at 635 (“Weirdly and perhaps unintentionally, however, it is
precisely this conservative reactionism that has provided the impetus for increased
family diversity.”).
19. See infra Section III.B.1.
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tenable option for many progressive people, given its constraining nature and its history of discrimination and abuse of women.
The constraints of marriage are built on a complex network of
behavioral expectations that limit the freedom of spouses (whether
20
cross-sex or same-sex) throughout their lives. The expectations around
women, marital roles, and having children are part of the bigger web of
social rules that serve to limit spouses. Against this backdrop, marriage
21
operates as a crucial social ordering device.
Feminist literature has long articulated how marriage has traditionally been a source of discrimination and oppression for women in terms
22
of both reproduction and division of labor. Under this theoretical
framework, the marriage equality movement has undermined not only
queer attempts at pluralizing families, but also women’s liberation: “By
appropriating familial ideology, lesbians and gay men may be supporting the very institutional structures that create and perpetuate women’s
23
oppression.”
Additionally, non-normative families often have many characteris24
tics that do not fit within marriage’s confines. Many queer activists
(holding a so-called “radical pluralist position”) have harshly criticized
the personal cost of assimilation that same-sex couples bore in order to
25
gain access to marriage. In the famous essay “Since When Is Marriage
20. Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV.
1901 (2000).
21. Id. I offer the following personal anecdote by way of elaboration: Last summer I attended the wedding reception of a relative in Southern Italy, a fairly conservative
place. After the meal, the conversation drifted to the couple having children. The
bride was 45 years old, and it was unlikely that she would be able to have biological
children. The people around me knew that and seemed dismayed. The conversation
went on for about twenty minutes. When I abruptly but quietly said “Let her live her
life,” they were taken aback, as if my words made no sense to them.
22. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE
CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE (2010) (advocating for the separation of marriage and the
state, and the introduction of a narrow legal status that includes all intimate caregiving unions); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in MARRIAGE AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FAMILIES 224
(Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012).
23. Didi Herman, Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women’s Liberation, 28 OSGOODE
HALL L.J., 797 (1990). Some scholars went further by associating marriage with slavery or prostitution. See, e.g., KATHY BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1971); Roberta
Hamilton, Women, Wives and Mothers, in RECONSTRUCTING THE CANADIAN
FAMILY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 3 (Nancy J. Mandell & Ann Duffy eds., 1988).
24. See infra Section III.B.1.
25. See, e.g., MATTILDA BERNSTEIN SYCAMORE, THAT’S REVOLTING!: QUEER STRATEGIES
FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION (2008); Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel
Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 259 (2013); Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path
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a Path to Liberation?,” Paula Ettlebrick cautioned against the risk of as26
similation that comes with an extension of marriage to gay couples.
That concern, shared by many, is that by assimilating into traditional
marriage, same-sex couples will negate some of the most powerful as27
pects of their union, especially its “different and subversive” nature.
There is an additional problem here. Not only does marriage equality hold a limited potential for new families, it also, and more danger28
ously, has undermined the advocacy for pluralistic relationships that
29
do not necessarily align with a heteronormative married couple. The
marriage equality movement has unwittingly established a new hierarchy of socially legitimate relationships: in raising up married same-sex
couples, it necessarily left new or atypical relationships on the margins
30
of society. This fact has struck a fatal blow to family pluralism in many
31
states. The interest in extending marriage resulted in a priori opposition to legal alternatives to marriage, such as domestic partnerships and
civil unions, because those designations were seen as falling short of
32
achieving the same “dignity” as marriage. Such progressive skepticism

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

to Liberation?, reprinted in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S.
SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 683 (3d
ed. 2008).
See Ettelbrick, supra note 25, at 683. Gay litigators rejected her stance, and the position expressed in the Family Bill of Rights by Lambda attorney Evan Wolfson, calling
for an extension of marriage to same-sex families, prevailed. See Nancy D. Polikoff,
Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 529, 536 (2009).
Brenda Cossman, Family Inside/Out, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1994).
For an overview of the debate surrounding the prevalence of the marriage stance over
the liberationist fringe, see Polikoff, supra note 26, at 535–36.
Feinberg, supra note 25.
Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 538 (1990) (“[T]he prospect of lesbian marriage is detrimental because it creates a two-tier system of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ lesbians
that elevates married lesbian couples over other varieties of lesbian relationships.”); see
also Cossman, supra note 27, at 8; Ettelbrick, supra note 25, at 684 (“[T]he right to
marry will not transform our society from one that makes narrow, but dramatic, distinctions between those who are married and those who are not married to one that
respects and encourages choice of relationships and family diversity.”).
Cyril Ghosh, The Emergence of Marriage Equality and the Sad Demise of Civil Unions,
73 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1 (2017).
Before Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), civil unions or domestic partnerships effectively denied same-sex couples federal spousal benefits. See Garden State
Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (holding that the
law regarding civil unions in New Jersey ran afoul of the state equality clause since it
implicated a denial of federal benefits).
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toward alternative regimes has frequently resulted in laws that automati33
cally converted them into marriages.
Even if not directly seeking to repeal civil unions and other regimes, many LGBT advocates downplay such statuses, considering them
34
as mere stepping-stones to full marriage. By contrast, I argue that alternatives to marriage are better suited for the advancement of all families—including heterosexual—for several reasons, including their reduced focus on the traditional conjugal family, their plasticity, and,
35
often, their simplicity. I do not argue for the abolition of marriage for
couples who currently qualify for it. Instead, I argue that new families
and queer activists should concentrate on working with conservative
groups to further their common interest in plural family regimes.
Section I of the Article will provide a primer on the legal options
available to non-normative relationships. I will attempt to provide a
comprehensive menu of legal options for future reforms. Section II will
engage in a comparative analysis of conservative reforms in the U.S. and
Canada that extended eligibility requirements to new families, and those
that, although currently restricted to conjugal couples, could constitute
33. After the U.S. recognized same-sex marriage, states varied in what they did with civil
partnerships. Some, such as Delaware, decided to forcibly convert civil unions into
marriages. See Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statuses, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-anddomestic-partnership-statutes.aspx (last updated Nov. 18, 2014). Other states left
civil unions in place, but attempted to repeal the reciprocal beneficiary scheme. See
Civil Union Licenses, COOK COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE, https://www.cookcountyclerk.
com/service/civil-union-licenses (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); Council of the Dist. of
Columbia Comm. on Pub. Safety & the Judiciary, Report on Bill 18-482, Religious
Freedom and Civil Marriage Amendment Act of 2009, Gay & Lesbian Activists Alliance (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.glaa.org/archive/2009/b18-482committeereport
1110.pdf. Reactions to these decisions were mixed at best. The forcible conversion of
civil unions into marriages has been called “sad,” since it sacrifices the potential that
alternative regimes hold to be meaningfully different from marriage. Ghosh, supra
note 31 (speaking in the heading of her Article of a “Sad Demise of Civil Unions”).
34. See, e.g., Civil Unions: Stepping Stone to Same-Sex Marriage, UNITED FAMILIES
INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 2, 2011), https://unitedfamilies.org/homosexuality/civilunions-stepping-stone-to-same-sex-marriage/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (quoting
the following excerpt from an ACLU press release: “Although the passage of civil union legislation represents an important step forward on the road toward full equality
for LGBT individuals in Illinois, the ACLU continues to work to achieve the freedom to marry for all couples.”); Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has
Compelling Reasons to Adopt a Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act, 5 L. &
SEXUALITY 541, 568 (1995) (arguing in favor of the Reciprocal Beneficiary Act as a
wise intermediate step toward full equality for same-sex couples).
35. These new regimes tend to be easier to enter into and dissolve, are scarcely formalized, and in the case of designated beneficiary schemes, they set out a very clear and
short set of benefits that parties can assign to one another by merely checking a box.
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a viable model for protecting all new families if their eligibility requirements were amended. In doing so, I will assess how such schemes reflect
upon the notion of family, and the extent to which they have already
resulted in family legal pluralism. Section III tries to operationalize legal
recognition by analyzing the potential paths to gain it. I will first anticipate and respond to criticism surrounding recognition of new families,
and then will lay the ground for rethinking queer activists’ political action. I will offer some recommendations on (a) the best model for implementation and (b) how to form alliances with conservative groups.
A. Definitional Section
1. What is a Family?
The AHA defines family as “two or more people who share resources, share responsibility for decisions, share values and goals, and
36
have commitments to one another over time.” I believe this definition
needs to be supplemented with three additional criteria germane to
identifying a family:
(1) A free decision to enter into the relationship, made by
37
consenting adults,
(2) A commitment to take responsibility for the other
38
person(s), and

36. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 33. When it comes to decisions as to whether parties are
economically interdependent, I share the view of the Alberta Law Reform Institute
that the criterion should rely on a presumption of reciprocal dependence to avoid
costly and cumbersome inquiries into personal aspects of the relationship. See
ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, PROPERTY DIVISION: COMMON LAW COUPLES
AND ADULT INTERDEPENDENT PARTNERS, FINAL REPORT 112, at 46 (June 2018)
(“Legislated eligibility criteria should instead rely on presumptions. If the relationship
between two individuals meets certain observable criteria, it should be presumed that
they have formed an economic partnership or that they intend to share property.”).
37. As I explain further below, minors are not eligible to enter a caregiving relationship
under the proposed approach. Though children can of course be parented by new
families, this Article contemplates only those family relationships that are “horizontal,” that is, between equal and consenting adults. Within horizontal relationships, I
have made a methodological choice to include both non-conjugal relationships
(where a sexual component is absent, such as siblings) and non-normative conjugal
units (which include an unconventional sexual component, as in polyamorous relationships) in this Article’s analysis.
38. U.S. courts usually adopt similar requirements in determining whether a common
law marriage exists. In addition to the foregoing, courts also consider also whether the
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(3) That the relationship be of some duration.

39

The first criterion makes it clear that the new family partnership is
a horizontal relationship. It thus prevents a party from entering into a
40
formal, intimate relationship with a minor (a vertical relationship).
This condition is similarly not met when there is a legal duty of support
between the family members. For instance, parents who owe a duty of
41
care to adult children cannot enter into a horizontal relationship with
42
that child.
The second criterion requires investigation into whether the relationship is maintained upon a willful decision to take responsibility for
the other person(s). Note, however, that taking responsibility is not
synonymous with joint legal responsibility for acts committed by another person. It merely points to the intention to commit to and take care
of the other parties to the relationship. In this way, the second criterion
distinguishes new families from parties merely engaging in sexual or relational behavior without commitment. Legal reforms in this field
should sort out those relationships that are based on a decision, rather

39.
40.

41.

42.

members’ welfare is prioritized above that of others. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert
E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 304–05 (2015).
I hesitate to include a timeline for qualification, but any legal scheme will likely require one year or more.
The legal definition of “minor” for purposes of the proposed scheme is left to the relevant authority, usually the state or another delegated authority. The state could allow persons above or below the age of 16 to enter a horizontal relationship scheme,
under certain conditions such as parental consent. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 551.103 (Westlaw through P.A. 2018 No. 341, 2018 Reg. Sess. of 99th Mich. Leg.
2007).
Parents might owe a duty of care to their adult children for a number of reasons. For
example, in the context of separation, child support does not necessarily end when
children turn 18, especially when the child decides to pursue post-secondary education. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
10–11 (2017), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/09/01/2017-childsupport-guidelines.pdf (follow “2017 Child Support Guidelines” hyperlink).
One might wonder whether a lack of consent occurs whenever a party feels pressured
into the relationship due to moral or social reasons. An example might be the case of
an old and disabled aunt, who has no relatives left alive except her young nephew. In
this case, the nephew will be socially and intimately persuaded that his aunt needs
care, and will thus likely take on the burden of caring for her. In such a case, no legal
duty to support her can be traced to him, but still, the factual context generates a social and moral duty which is, to some extent, tantamount to a legal one. The factual
situation exerts such pressure on the nephew that no genuine and spontaneous horizontal relationship can be deemed present. Even so, I believe that this case is no exception to the notion of consent and that the nephew, if willing to enter a formal relationship with the aunt, should be allowed to do so.
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than a presumption (as would be the case with marriage), to take responsibility for one or more other persons. Such a functional inquiry
will help identify those relationships that deserve material benefits.
The third criterion, duration, is necessary to ensure that the parties
are emotionally and economically committed. While the creation of
such commitment and the amount of time necessary to form it is highly
43
subjective, a legal regime will necessarily require a fixed duration. A
more objective criterion requiring the relationship to be of some duration is useful in distinguishing extemporaneous relationships from more
solid ones. I believe that a durational requirement below one year would
pose problems in terms of administrability, as it would be complicated
44
for an administrator to verify that the relationship is enduring.
The definition provided above, however, is of general applicability.
The answer to the question “what kind of caregiving is relevant for
purposes of this Article?” is context-specific and depends on the model
of recognition for new families—whether registration, ascription, or
contract. This general definition will therefore have to be adjusted
according to the model of recognition.
As will be discussed more below, some models, such as registration
schemes and contractual models, restrict themselves to establishing eli45
gibility criteria. Parties who meet the eligibility criteria have the possi43. Heather Conway & Philip Girard, ‘No Place Like Home’: The Search for a Legal
Framework for Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain, 30 QUEEN’S
L.J. 715, 730 (2005) (“[A]t some necessarily arbitrary point, one can infer that the
‘trial’ period of a relationship has passed, such that it is reasonable to consider a
commitment to exist.”).
44. Ultimately, there is another criterion that could be helpful in distinguishing deserving
caregiving relationships from non-deserving relationships: the absence of a unilateral
direction in care. The criterion means that there is a virtual symmetry in the distribution of caregiving dutiest. Dependency is a different basis on which relationships can
unfold and deserves a specific legal framework, for that type of care needs to be rewarded in special ways (for example, through disability benefits and/or compensation
for private care). See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2004); Martha A. Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1403 (2001); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Martha A. Fineman,
The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010–2011);
Martha A. Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 240 (2001). I
decided to omit this criterion because I believe its inclusion would have had a discriminatory impact on people with disabilities. It is also unnecessary. Whenever a
disability affects the ability of the party to fully consent to a relationship, the lack of
consent is itself a sufficient bar to recognizing the relationship. When the disability
does not vitiate the party’s ability to consent, there is no valid reason for preventing a
person, however vulnerable, from entering into the relationship.
45. See infra Section I.A, C.
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bility of self-designating their beneficiary. Thus, for these two models,
policymakers only need to fix the formal eligibility criteria, such as the
number of persons able to formalize the relationship, and the type of the
qualifying relationship (whether it applies to relatives and/or friends,
46
conjugal and/or non-conjugal families, etc.).
In any such case, one of the first decisions in drafting eligibility criteria is to resolve the formal versus functional inquiry that the scheme
commands. For example, a formal inquiry might only ask: Are these two
unmarried people, who are consenting adults and of sound mind? If so,
47
they are eligible to become a family. By contrast, a functional inquiry
would examine the characteristics of the relationship, and ask: Are these
48
two unmarried individuals in a committed relationship? Or are they in
a mutually caregiving relationship? Functional definitions would always
be more flexible and could include a larger number of families. But they
might require an intrusion into the private sphere of the family unit,
and they are difficult and costly to administer. By contrast, formal criteria are easier to verify and are more respectful of autonomy because they
leave space for self-designation. Unlike registration and contracts, an ascriptive system ascribes a status to parties who meet the eligibility criteria, regardless of the will (or actions) of such parties. Therefore, it is necessary to define what the conditions should be for ascription. The
criterion referring to a commitment to take responsibility for the other
person(s) in the relationship is incompatible with this model, since ascription operates on the assumption that once functional characteristics
are detected, the status must be ascribed regardless of the parties’ will.
Legal scholarship employs several terms to refer to new family
relationships, partly because this field of scholarship is still a work in
progress, and partly because there is intrinsic difficulty in employing
analytical linguistic categories. Being aware of the “symbolic power of
legal kinship terminology,” one needs to choose one’s words with the

46. Thus, for contracts and registration schemes, legislators should use the first and second criteria to define eligibility criteria. By contrast, legislators should not use the
third criterion, duration. This is because contracts and registration models rest on
self-authorship: Any individual can decide to designate someone as beneficiary and/or
to acquire a status, without having to demonstrate that the relationship is of some
duration (just as two people marrying do not have to demonstrate the duration of
their relationship).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of
71st Gen. Assemb.).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32–701 to 710 (Westlaw through July 27, 2018).
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utmost care, so as to avoid the risks of regulation, normalization, and
49
exclusion inherent in ordinary linguistic labels.
For the purposes of this Article, I use phrases such as “aspiring novel families,” “non-normative relationships,” “adult horizontal relationships,” “new kinship unions,” and “unmarried family units,” but not entirely synonymously. Although they refer to the same subject—the new,
unconventional family—they stress different aspects of the relationship,
such as the lack of benefits or recognition, the lack of characteristics
consistent with the nuclear family, or the horizontality of the relationship. By contrast, terms like “families,” “family units,” and “relationships” are used interchangeably.
(i) Aspiring novel family units: This is a broad conception of the
family that includes any group of people, related or unrelated, who engage in caregiving but whose relationship is not yet legally recognized.
The term emphasizes the political agency of new family groups and their
quest for legal recognition.
(ii) Non-normative relationships: This term refers to relationships
that do not comply with the norm of the ideal marital couple, as accepted in the Western socio-legal culture—the nuclear, romantic, dyadic,
heterosexual family. “Non-normative” need not mean “unregulated.”
Non-normative family formations have historically slipped under the
radar of the law, as in the case of non-conjugal relationships in Alberta,
and some will continue to do so.
(iii) Adult horizontal relationships (or adult-adult relationships):
This term refers to a relationship that two or more consenting adults enter into, regardless of children. I used the phrase to underline the distinction between the asymmetrical “vertical” relationship between children and parents, and the symmetrical “horizontal” relationship of
50
consenting adults.
(iv) Non-marital family units: This is a broad phrase that encompasses all families developed outside of wedlock. The term places emphasis on the divide between marital couples and new families, and reminds the reader that new families are excluded from the standard
package of marital benefits, like tax breaks, evidentiary privileges, etc.
Marriage is still, much to the distaste of many, the “reigning proxy” for

49. Frederik Swennen & Mariano Croce, The Symbolic Power of Legal Kinship Terminology: An Analysis of ‘Co-motherhood’ and ‘Duo-motherhood’ in Belgium and the Netherlands, 25 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 181 (2016).
50. Note that the symmetry is just potential. All adult-adult relationships involve some
form of asymmetry at some point, as one of the parties may experience special problems or vulnerability and require additional support.
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51

relationships deserving of special status. The “unmarried unit” is thus a
viable linguistic option because it captures the nuanced landscape of
families who do not take on marital status.
(v) New kinship unions/networks: This term draws on the seman52
tic richness of “kinship” to refer to new families. For example, the
translation of “kinship” into Italian, my native language, results in either
parentela, which means “family,” or affinità, which means “friendship”
or “affinity.” This beautiful polysemous term thus contains both the
sense of mutual affinity and the shared consciousness of belonging to a
family, which are foundational aspects of new family formations.
Hence, this term can be used as a catch-all for all new families.
2. What is Recognition?
When using the term “recognition” without more, this Article refers to legal recognition, not cultural or social recognition. Within the
category of legal recognition, it will be important to distinguish between
formal and functional recognition. Formal recognition refers to the automatic legal consequences that attach to certain statuses, such as marriage, civil partnership, or the birth of a child. When partners register
their relationship, as in a marriage or a civil union, they are seeking
53
formal recognition.
By contrast, functional recognition will attach some legal consequences to relationships that do not have a legal status, but are functionally equivalent to relationships that are legally protected. A couple in
a common law marriage can seek survivorship benefits despite having no
formal recognition because the jurisdiction recognizes the union as be54
ing functionally equivalent to marriage. As discussed below, ascription
is a functional mechanism for recognition because it attaches specific

51. CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 108
(2010); Nancy F. Cott, The Public State, in JUST MARRIAGE 33 (Mary Lyndon Shanley, Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds.) (2004).
52. I intend to adopt a broad and inclusive definition of kinship, encompassing both
blood ties and interpersonal affinity. See Jane E. Cross, Nan Palmer, & Charlene L.
Smith, Kinship Groups that Deserve Benefits, 78 MISS. L.J. 791, 797 (2009).
53. Robert Leckey, Families in the Eyes of the Law: Contemporary Challenges and the Grip
of the Past 15(8) IRPP CHOICES 1, 13 (2009).
54. This is the case, for example, with common law couples in countries such as Canada,
where the status is ascribed by government agencies seeking to combat welfare fraud.
See infra Section I.B.
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consequences to couples that are deemed to resemble formally recog55
nized relationships.
Before continuing to the next section, it is important to clarify the
legal consequences that attach to recognition, namely, “rights and obligations,” “benefits,” “prerogatives,” and “status.”
The term “rights and obligations” usually refers to the private law
consequences of a regime, which can include property rights, succession
rights, health-related rights (or prerogatives) such as the right to make
decision vis-à-vis human remains or anatomical gifts, and support obligations (throughout the relationship or upon its dissolution).
The term “benefit” can be used in two ways: (i) as a catch-all term
to refer to material benefits (under both private and public law) and
immaterial benefits (such as the dignity that recognition can confer upon recognized families) or (ii) as a term referring to the legal consequences under public law, i.e., government benefits like social security,
welfare, tax allowances, etc. I use the term “prerogative” as a synonym
for public and private law “benefits,” especially in referring to healthrelated rights, such as visitation or medical decision-making.
And finally, “status” refers to the official position of the parties in a
relationship in society and before the law. If the parties acquire status,
they are no longer seen as “single” before the law, but as “civil partners,”
“domestic partners,” and the like. Marriage, like many registrationbased regimes, gives its participants a new legal status. Ascriptive regimes, by contrast, do not confer a unitary status—parties continue to
be considered legally single for some purposes, and family for other pur56
poses.

55. Id.
56. The “pacte civil de solidarité” (PACS) is a contractual partnership whereby two persons in France can govern some aspects of their relationship under agreed-upon
terms. See Joelle Godard, PACS Seven Years On: Is It Moving Towards Marriage?, 21
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 310, 317 (2007). At the outset, the contract did not confer a
status, and thus parties remained officially single. Id. In 2006, the law was amended
to the effect that the contract now confers a status (the parties become “pacsés”). Id.
Whether to consider PACS as recognition conferred under the contractual or the registration model is an open question, but because they now confer a status and because
legal consequences arise upon registration, I think of them as belonging under the
registration umbrella.
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Section I
Abstract Models to Recognize Non-Marital Families
This section provides a primer on the models for recognizing relationships other than marriage. This background knowledge will be necessary to understand the conservative legal initiatives that will be dealt
with in Section II. The models of recognition are the contractual model,
the ascription model, the registration model, and various combinations
of the three.
A. Contractual Model
The contractual model allows parties to structure their relationship
57
through contracts and wills, regardless of formal recognition. Through
cohabitation and caregiving arrangements, parties can take on marriagelike obligations and design a property regime similar to that of a married
58
couple. Through wills, a person can designate a beneficiary to inherit
59
property, just as married couples do.
At present, individuals can achieve some of the benefits of family
pluralism through private contracts like prenuptial agreements and
60
health care proxies. However, not all of the legal protections of
marriage can be assigned by contract. For instance, in the U.S., a person
cannot freely assign Social Security benefits, health insurance benefits,
61
or rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act. In Québec, one of
Canada’s civil law provinces, public law government programs recognize
unmarried couples on a functional basis, but such couples are always
62
legal strangers when it comes to private family law. Thus, a pure
contractual model (where all family-related matters are dealt with by
57. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 115 (2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1720747&rec=1&srcabs=1524246&alg=7&pos=3 (follow
“Download This Paper” hyperlink). Even though wills are not technically “contracts,” I refer to a “contractual model” for its more immediate evocative power.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 231 (2007).
61. Id.
62. Leckey, supra note 53, at 14. In Québec, de facto couples continue to be excluded
from all the remaining prerogatives in the field of succession. See Brigitte Lefebvre,
Récents développements en droit des successions: Le droit québécois, 14 ELECTRONIC J.
COMP. L. 23 (2010). Unmarried partners can inherit only by will and cannot make
gifts of future property. Id.
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contract) would require that current laws and regulations be amended to
allow for a broader array of benefits.
The contractual model is characterized by a high degree of flexibility since it allows parties to design the bundle of rights and obligations
63
that they deem appropriate, within the limits outlined above. By contrast, marriage and registration systems usually provide for a standard set
of rights and obligations that automatically accrue through those statuses, with some minor deviations. The contract’s tailor-made nature is just
a surface advantage; its most valuable asset is its ability to enhance personal autonomy. A legal contract allows the parties to articulate their
own expectations, as to “forge one’s own contractual regime and negoti64
ate the terms of one’s commitment [is] a valued tool in a free society.”
The contractual model’s benefits are also its shortcomings. This
model works best when parties participate on equal footing with each
other in the drafting of the agreement, share a relatively similar
65
knowledge, and have balanced bargaining powers. When this is not the
case, it is right to be concerned about the vulnerability of the weaker
66
party. This factor alone may outweigh the benefits of autonomy and
67
contractual freedom.
Additionally, private contractual law is cumbersome because it requires that parties invest a substantial amount of time and effort in
reaching an agreement. The cost of agreement includes both direct
costs—the legal fees required to enter into the contract—and indirect
costs—spending time, effort, and energy entering into a mutually bene68
ficial contract. Contracting also generates emotional costs for the parties. First, parties must articulate their expectations for the relationship.
This could lead parties to develop an adversarial mentality that might
69
result in negative feelings surrounding the negotiations. Agreements
also suffer from an optimism bias. Any illusions about the likely length
of the relationship or their own capacity to resolve future controversies

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See, e.g., LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 115.
Id.
See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
METZ, supra note 22, at 126 (arguing that caregiving itself creates vulnerability).
See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
See Helen Reece, Leaping Without Looking, in AFTER LEGAL EQUALITY: FAMILY, SEX,
KINSHIP 119 (Robert Leckey ed., 2015).
69. Id. at 120.
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will undermine parties’ ability to accurately articulate their expecta70
tions. It is unrealistic to think that these costs will not be relevant.
Furthermore, there is one key limitation to the contractual model
that hinders any further analysis: contracts are binding on parties, not
on the government. The consequence is that such arrangements are to
some extent “invisible” in the eyes of the state and irrelevant for its so71
cial law apparatus. Through contracts, families can only regulate areas
at free disposition of parties, such as property and financial aspects of
cohabitation. Public benefits do not fall within this area. Thus, many
families using contracts to overcome this invisibility find themselves in a
position where they can only achieve a very limited array of benefits and
rights.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada (“the Commission”), a
public body advising the Canadian government on family law, has iden72
tified two more problems associated with the contractual model.
73
1. Lack of “certainty.” The Commission reported that “throughout [their] consultations, it became clear that simply allowing people the
option to enter into private contracts . . . was insufficient because . . . it
74
[did not] offer sufficient guarantee of certainty.” Contracts create uncertainty because they lead to non-uniform legal regimes, which are administratively difficult to manage.
The Commission’s language can also be read in reference to the
couple’s uncertainty if their contractual language is unclear. There are
many unpredictable but potentially relevant aspects of a relationship
(e.g., rules for sharing property, child rearing, support upon dissolution
of the relationship, etc.) that can be difficult for parties to foresee. I
share this concern. It is unrealistic to think that the contract will
articulate all of the parties’ expectations. This is a shortcoming that
needs to be taken into account when choosing amongst different
models.
75
2. “Lack of official record of those private agreements.” The lack
of a publicly-held record would, in the words of the Commission,
prevent the “efficient administration of laws and programs where

70. See Anne Barlow, LEGAL RATIONALITY AND FAMILY PROPERTY, in SHARING LIVES,
DIVIDING ASSETS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 34 (Joanna K. Miles & Rebecca
Probert eds., 2009).
71. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
72. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 114.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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76

relationships could be relevant.” But this is not an intrinsic feature of
the model. Recently proposed legislation in Missouri and Alabama
shows that the state could start recording common contracts through its
77
The
clerks without many additional administrative costs.
Commission’s concern can therefore be addressed through a system that
sets forth the eligibility conditions to enter the contract, and asks the
state administration to merely check that such conditions are met.
B. Ascription
Under the ascription model, legal recognition (and legal conse78
quences) attach to cohabiting partners, whether they seek it or not.
Under an ascriptive regime, unmarried partners are conferred with mari79
tal-like rights and obligations, but not legal status. I believe such a system is premised on the assumption that there is little difference between
marriage and cohabitation. Ascription is a functional, rather than formal, system of recognition, in the sense that it inquires whether the parties “have functioned similarly to the members of formally recognized
80
family relationships,” such as marriage. Generally, the legal consequences flowing from ascription fall within the scope of private law (reciprocal rights and obligations) or public law (a package of social bene81
fits and tax exemptions).
This model is already implemented in many jurisdictions as
“common law marriage,” and it could extend to non-normative relationships—with some caveats. Such is the case in Alberta, Canada,
where any two persons (including friends, but excluding relatives) will
acquire the status of “Adult Interdependent Partners” if they live in a
three-year, interdependent relationship, or in a relationship “of some
82
permanence” while raising a child.
Unlike the contractual model, which demands an articulation of
the parties’ expectations and then crystallizes them in a contract, ascription operates when there is no previously verbalized set of expectations.
In this sense, the model can remedy inequalities and unarticulated de-

76. Id.
77. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018;
H.B. 1434, 2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018.
78. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
79. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 116.
80. Leckey, supra note 53, at 3.
81. Id. at 12.
82. See infra Section II.B.
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sires—especially for women, who are more likely to be the vulnerable
83
party. The system purports to prevent exploitation and impose obliga84
tions that correspond to the expectations of the majority of couples.
While there are some families who choose not to marry, many partners
“drift into” cohabitation and can overlook the consequences of the new
85
arrangement. Ascription is intended to correct this problem.
My view is that this system cannot truly apply to aspiring family
formations. It is imperative that parties in new families attempt to articulate their desires for their relationship, since they are inherently new
and non-normative. It would be a mistake for a non-traditional family
to rely on traditional notions of familyhood. New families have characteristics—who they love and how—that are unique by definition, and
the category of new family is too heterogeneous to expect the state to
make a great effort in categorizing or according the appropriate benefits
to all of them. By articulating their desires and expectations, new families also avoid the risk of assimilating into a hegemonic norm, as with
86
state categorization.
87
Additionally, ascription can infringe on personal autonomy. Parties in committed relationships—especially the wealthier party—might
not intend to bind themselves in a marriage-like arrangement. Some
scholarship has aptly referred to ascription as “conscription,” emphasiz88
ing the compulsory nature of the regime. Under an ascriptive regime,
parties not only fail to consent to the regime, but might also lack aware89
ness that consequences have attached at all. Efforts can be made to
raise public awareness about the consequences of an ascriptive regime,

83. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 3 OSLO L. REV.
133, 136–38 n.6–16 (2017) (challenging the idea of marriage as a partnership between equals, and analyzing the multiple contexts showing that it was and is a gender-dependent union, such as accumulation of property and divorce).
84. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
85. Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of
Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 151–67 (2000).
86. Foucault has described how normalization operates by describing a four-step approach whereby the state: (i) eliminates or disqualifies what it terms as useless and irreducible; (ii) normalizes remaining knowledges to make them communicate and fit
together; (iii) creates a hierarchy of knowledge, whereby the most particular and least
generalizable knowledges become subordinated; (iv) builds a pyramidal centralization
that enables it to control these knowledges. Foucault, supra note 7, at 180.
87. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 116.
88. Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
279, 296 (2008).
89. Id. (“Although people may opt out of certain statutory provisions governing their
relationships, they are not always aware of this possibility.”).
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when enacted, but even so, the autonomy conundrum might be difficult
to overcome.
A serious shortcoming of the ascription model also lies in its overinclusive nature. This danger is clear in the case of conjugal relationships, such as common law couples. Once statutory conditions are met,
90
all couples are treated alike, regardless of their concrete attributes. The
same over-inclusion might arise in the case of non-conjugal relationships. This shortcoming could be further accentuated if one considers
that, absent a sexual component within the relationship, two roommates
or friends who do not wish to bind themselves could become family in
the eyes of the law if the eligibility requirements are easy enough to
meet (e.g., mere cohabitation). There is no bright line that separates a
friend from an interdependent life partner. Given the difficulty in determining the economic and emotional link between these parties, any
ascriptive mechanism is likely to be fraught with error.
There are different means of implementing an ascription model.
When attachment of the legal consequences occurs independent of the
91
request of any of the parties, it is called “pure ascription.” Conversely,
when recognition comes at a partner’s request, it is called “partial ascrip92
tion.”
1. Purely Ascriptive Recognition
There are many examples of purely ascriptive recognition. Financial aid for university students in the U.S. is allocated purely by ascription: public financial aid awards may be reduced if the lender learns that
93
the student’s unmarried parents are in a marriage-like relationship.
This reduction occurs independent of a request by the student or her parents.

90. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 116. See also discussion infra Introduction,
Section A.
91. Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1313 (2014).
92. Id. at 1313–33 (offering an account of the difference between pure and partial ascription). Legal scholarship does not always distinguish between these two types of ascription. However, cases triggering pure and partial ascription are qualitatively different,
and deserve an ad hoc analysis.
93. Rebecca Klein, FAFSA Changes to Recognize Same-Sex Parents by 2014, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 30, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/fafsachangessame-sex-parents-2014_n_3185755.html; Erez Aloni, Relationship Recognition Madness, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/erez-aloni/relationship-recognition-madness_b_3422346.
html?utm_hp_ref=college&ir=College#es_share_ended.
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Ascription is more problematic when it deals with legal recognition
that neither party seeks. It can also have significant draconian effects on
a new family. In a pure ascriptive regime, state recognition might result
in economic injustice: for example, by determining, via ascription, that
94
a family is no longer entitled to a public benefit. This phenomenon is
95
called “deprivative recognition,” and is particularly acute in the context
96
of government welfare benefits. For example, in California, Oklahoma, and Kansas, an unmarried adult male residing in the house can result in termination or reduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF)—a federal welfare program that helps needy children
97
and their families.
Pure ascription can also bring about economic maldistribution in
that it deprives parties of the benefits of singlehood, but does not simultaneously confer the economic privileges of family status (such as tax ex98
emptions). It is thus an asymmetrical system which can result in deprivation and economic injustice for new families.
2. Partially Ascriptive Recognition
“Partial ascription” models require that at least one party initiates
an action. For example, in many places, upon dissolution of an unmar99
ried partnership, a party can bring a claim for maintenance. The court
will inquire into the nature of the relationship and consider the parties
as if they were legal spouses if certain functional attributes are met, such
100
as the duration of cohabitation. Partial ascription is somewhat less
problematic than pure ascription, as the recognition of rights or duties

94. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1313.
95. Id. at 1314.
96. Kieran Tranter, Lyndal Sleep, & John Stannard, The Cohabitation Rule: Indeterminacy and Oppression in Australian Social Security Law, 32 MELB. U.L. REV. 698, 699
(2008); Leckey, supra note 53, at 31. But see Aloni, supra note 91, at 1320.
97. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1321–22. For California, see ANN. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11351.5 (Westlaw through Ch. 181 of 2018 Reg. Sess.). See also Russell v.
Carleson, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (finding the foregoing law
compatible with the constitution). The reason only three states have this rule, despite
it being a federal program, is that each state defines the relevant “family unit” for
purposes of the program.
98. See Garrison, supra note 88, at 296 (“Because cohabitation typically does not produce
the same income-pooling benefits as marriage, a policy based on the assumption of
income-pooling by cohabitants is counterfactual and might produce serious inequity.”).
99. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 1976).
100. Aloni, supra note 91, at 1313.
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has the potential to surprise just one member of a relationship, instead
101
of both.
Some excerpts from the factual background of the Canadian case
102
Ross v. Reaney can be illuminating in this regard. Ross and Reaney
were same-sex partners for 18 years, but lived apart for several years due
103
to Reaney’s job.
[2] Ross is now 46 years old and is self-employed for
approximately 6 months a year as a personal trainer. His
disclosed income is approximately $19,000.00 USD
annually. . . .
[3] Reaney is 47 years old and is self-employed in
Ontario as a consultant. His disclosed annual income is
104
$126,000.00 [CAD].
This background information reflects the economic asymmetry the
couple experienced, which prompted Ross to seek financial support upon dissolution of the relationship.
[3] Ross alleges that the parties were in a committed same
sex relationship for approximately 18 years. . . .
[4] Ross alleges that during the course of their
relationship, the couple made joint decisions with respect to
all aspects of their lives and shared their lives including joint
participation in financial decisions, social life, and
management of their domestic lives. Ross says that their
relationship was sexually intimate. They vacationed together.
They purchased property together. They maintained
principal and other residences together and cared for each
other during times of illness. They gave gifts to each other
and celebrated holidays and special events together. They
held themselves out as partners to their families and
105
friends. . . .

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Ross v. Reaney, 2003 CanLII 1929 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶ 3.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 1–3. The amount of the property is in USD as it was
generated in Florida, where Mr. Ross, the claimant, worked.
105. Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 3–4 (emphasis added).
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The passage shows Ross’s attempt to support his claim for interim
106
support. He emphasizes that the couple was in a “committed”
107
relationship to trigger partial ascription of benefits.
[6] Reaney denies that the parties were in a committed same
sex relationship for 18 years. He claims that the relationship
existed for 3 years from 1985 to 1988 at which time Reaney
moved to Harvard to complete a 1-year Masters Program. In
1988, Reaney learned that Ross was HIV positive which,
according to Reaney, led to dramatic changes in the nature of
their relationship . . . Reaney denies that they were sexually
intimate after the diagnosis. . . .
[7] Reaney denies that there was any emotional
108
commitment to Ross other than as friend. . . .
Here, Reaney is acting pro domo sua (in his own interest). He asserts that the two were not in a committed relationship and that they
109
were bound only by friendship.
[9] . . . In December 1995, Reaney was paying Ross
$3,000 per month. Between June 2002 and August 2002
Reaney unilaterally reduced the payments to $1,500 per
month. In August 2002, the payments were terminated. At
this time Reaney was openly and ultimately involved with
another partner. Ross says that this ended his relationship
with Reaney.
[10] Ross alleges that Reaney began paying the salary
after Ross began suffering from chronic fatigue. . . . The
salary was a method of providing Reaney with a means of
110
splitting income for income tax purposes.
In order to gain an advantage in the lawsuit, each party reported the
other’s fraudulent conduct, as when Reaney alluded to the income111
splitting technique, and even resorted to disclosing details of their
112
sexual life. While Ross glorified their story of true love and firm

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 3–4 (emphasis added).
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 3–4.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 6–7.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 6–7.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 9–10.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 9–10.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶¶ 6–8.
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commitment, Reaney referred to Ross as no more than a friend and
113
rejected all of Ross’s factual claims.
The important takeaway of the case is that ascription places a great
burden on the members of a family who do not want the commitment.
One should ask whether redistribution of property from Reaney to Ross
is fair. Suppose that, for whatever reason, Reaney did not want to
commit to a long-term partnership with Ross. He must therefore have
chosen to either end their cohabitation prematurely or else to accept
legal ascription. Reaney must also have refrained from transferring
money to Ross, even if Reaney’s financial situation permitted it, even if
Ross’s health was compromised, and even if Reaney would have liked to
do so. It is hard to see how such a system could represent the best
approach to supporting new families.
Partial ascription also creates a barrier to the formation of new
supportive networks. It often triggers an intrusive inquiry into partners’
lifestyles and sexual and emotional intimacy, as the Ross v. Reaney case
114
shows. The same goes for non-conjugal partners. Professor Aloni
points out that “[i]n the welfare context . . . having an unrelated adult
in one’s apartment almost immediately invites questions from social
115
workers and could easily deter people from living together.” This kind
of public probing might impair the flourishing of new kinship unions in
another respect: It could require people to define their relationship
before they otherwise would wish to do so, and then effectively lock the
parties into that definition.
Under either approach, the cons outweigh the pros. Involuntary
and compulsory recognition are more costly for new families than com116
plete unrecognition.
C. Registration
Registration is a formal remedy through which parties gain a status,
as well as rights and benefits attached to that status. Civil unions,
designated beneficiary schemes, and domestic partnerships are all
examples of the registration model. Like marriage, all such registration

113.
114.
115.
116.

Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929, ¶ 7.
Ross, 2003 CanLII 1929.
Aloni, supra note 91, at 1329.
Id. at 1280 (“Largely missing from the celebration of recognition in the law of domestic relations is the simple yet meaningful fact that legal recognition comes with a
financial cost—sometimes an unjust cost.”).
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117

schemes trigger automatic legal consequences. And as with previous
systems, such consequences might fall within the scope of private law,
public law, or both. Registration-related rights, duties, and benefits
118
might mirror those attached to marriage—or not.
When registration schemes offer the same benefits as marriage (as
with civil unions), they operate as functional equivalents to marriage. In
such cases, it is a common drafting technique for legislators to simply
add a line of text (such as “or civil unions”) to existing marriage-related
119
statutes. But registration schemes can be a separate regime from marriage altogether, and thereby attach a different package of legal conse120
quences. This segregated regime is achieved by creating a new set of
rights, duties, and benefits, which are usually less extensive than those
121
associated with marriage.
Unlike a contractual arrangement, registration saves parties time
and effort because it can be based on a regime of certain benefits and
122
obligations being packaged together by default. But like the contractual model, it is a “formal” model for determining parties’ rights and
123
duties. It is also respectful of personal autonomy in that it requires
parties to take affirmative steps to publicly express their commitment
and articulate their expectations, unlike functional regimes that ascribe a
124
status regardless of the will of the parties.
The chief critique of the registration model is that it is excessively
125
rigid, particularly as far as public law benefits are concerned.
Registration essentially confers a bundle of benefits to replicate those of

117. See LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 117.
118. See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 591–94 (2013).
119. This is the case in Italy. Art. 20 LEGGE 20 MAGGIO 2016, n. 76 at ¶ 33. The law is
entitled “Regolamentazione delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso sesso e disciplina delle convivenze” [Rules concerning civil unions between same-sex partners and
the legal framework of cohabitation]. Art. 20 LEGGE 20 MAGGIO 2016, n. 76.
120. Aloni, supra note 118, at 591–94.
121. See infra Figure 2 and Section II.B. This is also true for countries outside the purview
of this Article. For instance, in Italy, same-sex and opposite-sex couples can enter a
civil partnership through registration, which, notwithstanding a clause equating their
status to that of married couples, does not confer a duty of fidelity, nor a right to
adopt children. See also Art. 20 LEGGE 20 MAGGIO 2016, n. 76, “Regolamentazione
delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso sesso e disciplina delle convivenze” [Rules
concerning civil unions between same-sex partners and the legal framework of cohabitation].
122. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 117.
123. See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
124. LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 57, at 117.
125. See, e.g., Elizabeth Brake, Book Review, 30 PHIL. REV. 418, 420 (reviewing TAMARA
METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT (2010)).
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marriage—the traditional means of allocating social goods. Critics note
that registration schemes fail to account for all the possible forms that
adult relationships might take.
I argue that there are two forms of registration: (1) what I will call
“registration by default,” where given benefits are automatically attached
to the legal status, and (2) “registration by design,” where parties designate the beneficiaries of their benefits (with each benefit potentially con126
ferred upon different beneficiaries).
1. Registration by Default
The most common form of a registration scheme is one where pre127
determined benefits are automatically attached to a given status. Examples of registration by default schemes in comparative perspective are
128
many and range from domestic partnerships to civil unions. The most
significant examples for purposes of the present Article are the reciprocal
and designated beneficiary schemes in the U.S., as will be discussed in
129
Section II. Registration by default schemes, in the most common
form, are “comprehensive,” such that a range of benefits accrue to the
parties. They can also be narrowly focused in the sense that the predetermined consequences of registration concern only the specific bene130
fits that a government agency administers.
Many innovative proposals for protecting new kinship unions are
comprehensive registration by default schemes. One example is the “intimate caregiving union” (“ICGU”) scheme proposed by Tamara

126. The selected terminology echoes the privacy-by-default/privacy-by-design dichotomy,
coined by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner of Ontario in the 1990s. It by no
means intends to refer to the legal meaning acquired by these locutions in the field of
privacy. It merely recalls its prima facie meaning, which seems applicable to registration models as well.
127. Leckey, supra note 53, at 12 (defining registration itself as a “legislatively established
framework of rights and obligations that the parties to a relationship can take on.”).
128. See William N. Eskridge, Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus,
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1935– 40 (2012). The trend
of adding new options to the menu of relationships is widespread in Western legal
systems. For European examples, see generally JENS M. SCHERPE, EUROPEAN FAMILY
LAW VOLUME III: FAMILY LAW IN A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2016).
129. See infra Section II.A.
130. This system is in force in the Canadian province of Manitoba, and it allows nonmarried conjugal couples to register with the government agency to gain a few marital
benefits, such as property division rules. Family Property Act, C.C.S.M. c. F25
(Can.).
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Metz. She suggests introducing a new legal framework in the U.S.
132
whereby marriage is replaced with an ICGU status. The newly created
status would remove the state from the ethically-driven choice of extending marriage and would instead recognize all intimate caregiving
133
units. She also contends that marriage should be disestablished:
Against suggestions that the state’s legitimate welfare
concerns with respect to intimate associational life are best
treated by reforming marriage or replacing it with a system of
private contract, an intimate caregiving union status,
narrowly and carefully tailored to recognize, protect, and
support intimate caregiving in its many forms, would most
effectively balance liberal commitments to liberty, equality,
134
and stability.
Metz’s account is premised on the assumption that recognition of
caregiving units through status, as opposed to contract, is the only viable
way to remedy social injustice and protect these unions. According to
Metz, adult-adult intimate caregiving relationships need “the special
135
recognition and protection that only a status can afford.” For Metz,
defining what constitutes a “caregiving” union and what benefits will
136
accrue to them are questions that remain open.
2. Registration by Design
The chief critique of the registration by default model is that it is
excessively rigid, particularly as far as public law benefits are concerned.
This registration essentially confers a bundle of benefits to replicate the
traditional means of allocating social goods through marriage.
Registration by design differs from registration by default in that parties
can, after registering their relationship, freely choose the beneficiary (or

131. Professor Metz provides a lucid account of acceptable goals vis-à-vis marriage within
the context of a liberal state. Provided that the state cannot perform duties as an ethical authority, it must limit its action to promote social goals not driven by ethics,
such as public health. In order to limit the ethical role of states in this field, the preferred option is that of separating marriage from the state. See METZ, supra note 22,
at 14.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 140.
136. See generally METZ, supra note 22.
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beneficiaries) upon whom they wish to confer benefits. Each benefit
need not be assigned to the same beneficiary. Put differently, parties can
“customize” the allocation of their subsidies and designate different
beneficiaries. In this way, the registration by design scheme prizes
personal autonomy.
But a registration by design system creates additional administrative burdens because there are no default rules, as with marriage and registration by default. Accordingly, the system does not excel in clarity or
simplicity, as evinced by the following two examples.
In her piece “Friends with Benefits,” Professor Laura A. Rosenbury
analyzes the way people provide care outside of the home, particularly
137
among friends. She starts from the fundamental premise that people
can perform multiple caregiving functions over time, and that fluidity is
inherent in family formations (other than marital or marital-like rela138
tionships). In order to protect and reflect these shifting networks of
reciprocal care, she argues, family law has to introduce a mechanism
that permits a person to assign some of the benefits traditionally at139
tached to marriage to individuals of their choice. For example, a person could decide that she wanted her health insurance benefits to be
shared with a sibling, her family and medical leave be given to a grand140
mother, and that hospital visitation rights be assigned to a dear friend.
The main benefit of such an approach is that there need not be a
comprehensive bundle of benefits and obligations that parties must ac141
cept as such and then allocate to only one partner. Rosenbury also requires that the allocation of the benefit(s) be done on a mutual basis,
such that one receives caregiving benefits only as long as he or she ac142
cepts caregiving responsibilities. This clearly makes the system more
workable.
The benefits of self-designation are undoubted from an autonomy
perspective. A registration by design (or similar system allowing for multiple, symmetrical designations that do not come in the form of registration) would be beneficial to the flourishing of queer formations that are
nomadic and can hardly find legal categories to reflect their complexi-

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Rosenbury, supra note 60.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230–31.
Id.
Id. at 231. A proposal from Steve Sugarman concerning the Short Term Paid Leave
plan in the employment context echoes a similar approach. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term Paid Leave: A New Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 CAL. L. REV. 465, 466–73 (1987).
142. Rosenbury, supra note 60, at 232.
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143

ty. A flexible model like Rosenbury’s would allow parties in more
atypical arrangements to think of themselves as a “family,” as opposed
to thinking of their relationship as a mere happenstance. Legal scholarship has long acknowledged the dynamic interplay between social facts
144
and legal categories. This type of model would provide parties to
queer assemblies with more malleable concepts to frame their relationships. Furthermore, in allowing for multiple beneficiaries, registration
by design schemes effectively eliminate legal definitions of “family,” as
145
long as they are no longer necessary for conferring rights. In this
sense, the system reduces the risk of assimilation inherent in legal defini146
tions.
Professor Aloni has a similar proposal, which he calls “registered
147
contractual relationships” (“RCRs”). Professor Aloni believes that future information technology will facilitate the introduction of a system
with multiple legal designations because it will enhance the government’s ability to check who has been designated and for what purpose,
thereby overcoming the main shortcoming of designation by design sys148
tems: their administrability.
Professor Rosenbury and Professor Aloni both leave open questions
about designing a workable proposal. How should beneficiaries be designated? How could someone designate different beneficiaries for different benefits? How could the government check which person has been
designated as the beneficiary of a specific benefit? Should parties still be
allowed to have multiple beneficiaries for the same benefit; if so, to what
149
extent? While viable for non-costly benefits, such as hospital visitation, major concerns could surely be raised for costly programs, such as

143. See Frederik Swennen & Mariano Croce, Family (Law) Assemblages: New Modes of
Being (Legal), 44 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 532 (2017).
144. Id. at 556.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Swennen & Croce, supra note 49; Lauren Berlant & Micheal Warner, Sex in
Public, in QUEER STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 170 (Robert J. Corber &
Stephen Valocchi eds., 2003); Stacey Young, Dichotomy and Displacement: Bisexuality
in Queer Theory and Politics, in PLAYING WITH FIRE: QUEER POLITICS, QUEER
THEORIES (Shane Phelan ed., 1997).
147. Notwithstanding the proposal’s alleged “contractual” nature, Professor Aloni refers to
the possibility of registering based either on a contract or on a form prearranged by
the administration. Aloni, supra note 118, at 608.
148. Id. at 608–09.
149. I believe that the main objection to polygamy is that there are financial constraints
that prevent the possibility of conferring the same benefit to several people. Giving
different benefits to different people, as long as you give them just to one person at a
time, is a different situation which does not implicate this problem.
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survivor pensions or health care benefits. These practicalities advise
against considering this option at present.
I believe that the registration by design model is underdeveloped in
its answers to these questions. While the model is appealing for its emphasis on flexibility and personal autonomy, it requires further research.
3. A tertium genus?
If one thinks of registration by default and registration by design as
two Manichean opposites, it makes sense to inquire into whether a third
option exists within the macro-category “registration.” Indeed, I suggest
thinking of the registration by default and registration by design models
as the two extremes of a continuum. An ideal system could be somewhere in the middle—for example, a system with default rules that are
supplemented by a robust opt-out regime. Such a system could allow
parties to choose which benefits to confer but restrict the designation to
only one beneficiary. This system, despite being closer to a registration
by default model, shares some valuable characteristics of registration by
design models, especially the flexibility of the assigned benefits.
This middle-ground option was implemented in the Designated
150
151
Beneficiary Act in Colorado that I discuss further below. While the
Designated Beneficiary Act does not allow two parties to designate multiple beneficiaries, it does allow them to tailor the partnership agreement
152
by choosing which benefits to confer upon their beneficiary. This intermediate category strikes a reasonable balance between flexibility and
administrability.
D. Mixed Systems
Another way to recognize aspiring family units is to merge two
general models into a hybrid one. This section will first address a
system, developed in legal scholarship, that is based on registration and
transformative redistribution through ascription. It will then briefly

150. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105 (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st
Gen. Assemb.).
151. See infra Section II.A.
152. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105 (3) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of
71st Gen. Assemb.) (“A designated beneficiary agreement shall entitle the parties to
exercise the following rights . . . unless specifically excluded from the designated
beneficiary agreement . . . .”).
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discuss the scheme currently in force in Alberta, Canada, which is also
153
based on a hybrid of registration and ascription. Both systems adopt a
formal and a functional approach to legal recognition.
Professor Polikoff developed the first proposal for providing benefits to new families, and it draws on both registration and redistribution
154
through ascription. Like Professor Rosenbury, Polikoff asserts that
people who want to formalize their relationship must be able to do so
155
outside the narrow boundaries of marriage and conjugality. Under
Polikoff’s “valuing all families” approach, someone without a spouse or
domestic partner could still register for benefits and indicate a “desig156
nated family member” to be the recipient. Her registration scheme,
however, does not confer onto new families the same rights, obligations,
157
and benefits that flow from marriage. Polikoff identifies Vermont’s
law protecting “reciprocal beneficiaries”—a scheme that will be considered in depth in Section II.A.2.—as the one that most resembles her approach. Accordingly, for Polikoff and under the Vermont statute, registration benefits would be limited to health-related rights and abuse
158
prevention.
Polikoff’s proposal differs from the Vermont regime in a several
ways. First, the Vermont law limited eligible beneficiaries to blood relatives, but Polikoff has proposed expanding that to allow a person to des159
ignate a non-relative beneficiary. Second, unlike the Vermont law,
Polikoff has added that when someone dies intestate, his beneficiary
160
could inherit his estate, just the same as if the person were a spouse. If
a person dies without having designated a family member, Polikoff argues that the government should investigate which beneficiary the person would have designated, had he envisaged the possibility of doing
161
so. This is a positive, rather than deprivative, example of pure ascription. Finally, Polikoff argues that wrongful death statutes should be
162
based on the beneficiary’s actual dependency on the deceased worker.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A–4.5 (Can.).
Rosenbury, supra note 60.
POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 126.
Id. at 134–35.
Id.
See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301–1306 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 135; see also 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
160. Id. at 134–35.
161. Id. at 135–36.
162. See POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 195. Proof of dependency refers to the need to provide
proof that the claimant was financially dependent upon the deceased worker. It thus
differs from the presumption of dependency that often attaches to spouses and chil-
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Polikoff asserts that under a “valuing-all-families” approach, all possible
family members (including parties to non-normative families) could
163
show dependency.
A second example of a hybrid system comes from a law in Alberta,
164
Canada, called the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (AIRA).
The system is a mixed one based on both a contractual and ascriptive
model. It will be further analyzed in Section II. In brief, AIRA sets forth
two different models for recognition. Parties can either sign a written
165
agreement (contractual model), or they can acquire legal status as a
family if they either: (1) live in a three year-long interdependent relationship; or (2) are in a relationship “of some permanence,” while rais166
ing a child (ascription). AIRA is more limited than Polikoff’s proposal
in that under Section (3)(2) of AIRA, persons related to each other by
blood or adoption are not eligible for ascription and may only become
167
adult interdependent partners by entering into a written agreement.
Under AIRA, close friends and roommates who meet the eligibility cri168
teria can have legal status ascribed. As discussed previously, the downside of ascription is the limitation on personal freedom to decide wheth169
er to formalize a relationship.
Section II
Legal Initiatives
The distinction between “philosophically-driven” and “politicallydriven” legal initiatives has special significance in the field of marriage

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

168.
169.

dren in such statutes, including the California statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. C. § 377.60
(b),(c) (2007)).
POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 5.
Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5 (Can.).
Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1)(b) (Can.).
Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1)(a) (Can.).
Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(2) (Can.). Since
these partnerships are formalized through a private contract, there are no statistics on
the number of contracted AIPs since the enactment of the law.
Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1)(a) (Can.)
The Consultation Report on the law voiced concerns that an ascriptive system applying across the board would impinge on the freedom of choice of two cohabiting relatives or friends unwilling to make a long-term commitment. Anu Nijhawan, Alberta’s
New Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, 22 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 157, 171
(2003). However, contrary to the recommendations of the Consultation Report on
the reform, Section (3)(2) of AIRA, setting out a duty to enter an agreement to become an AIP, only concerns relatives. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A.
2002, c A-4.5, § 3(2) (Can.).
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and status recognition. “Philosophically-driven” initiatives are essentially
political movements grounded in progressive concerns that have
170
By contrast,
emerged in socio-legal or political scholarship.
“politically-driven” laws are developed primarily by conservative
171
politicians who aim to preserve the status quo. The legal initiatives
examined below are politically-driven, with the exception of the scheme
172
in Colorado, which was pushed forward by progressive social groups.
Conservative groups who wanted to shift the public’s focus away
from the LGBT marriage equality struggle began to enact laws like those
173
below in 1997. They range from bills inspired by outright homophobia (as in the cases of Alberta, Canada; Alabama; and Missouri) to initiatives that simply diluted protection for same-sex couples by offering the
protections through a wider, and thus more ideologically neutral, regis174
tration scheme (as in Hawaii and Vermont). Subsection A will explore
the reciprocal and designated beneficiary schemes in the United States.
Subsection B will be devoted to Canada, and particularly to the scheme
in force in Alberta. Subsection C will deal specifically with the conservative bills in Alabama and Missouri that lay out an original variation of
the contractual model, featuring publicly-binding contracts.
A. Designated and Reciprocal Beneficiary Schemes in the U.S.
As discussed above, designated and reciprocal beneficiary schemes
are registration schemes for consenting adults who meet certain eligibility criteria. The difference between designated and reciprocal beneficiary
schemes mainly consists in the former being “tailor-made” (i.e. giving
the parties the opportunity to choose which benefits to confer upon
175
each other) and the latter conferring a definite set of rights.
As for the scope of eligibility, the parties that can take advantage of
the scheme vary from state to state. In some states (like Vermont and

170. Nicholas Bala, Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and
Other Adult Interdependent Relationships, QUEEN’S L.J. 41, 88–89 (2003); see also
COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE
CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 27 (2005).
171. Nicholas Bala, supra note 170, at 88–89; see also COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note
170, at 27.
172. The scheme constitutes the most flexible and comprehensive scheme enacted so far to
protect non-normative unions. It’s been included in the analysis for that reason despite being promoted by LGBT groups, not conservative groups.
173. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 69–72.
174. See infra Section I.A.
175. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, 281 (4th ed. 2015).
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Hawaii) the scheme reaches only couples who are legally unable to mar176
ry; in others (Colorado and Washington, D.C.) the scheme reaches all
sorts of non-normative relationships, including blood relatives; others
still (Maine and Maryland) split the difference, allowing access to a
number of relationships, but denying it to blood relatives, such as sib177
lings.
Figure 1. Families Eligible to Enter into Designated/Reciprocal
Beneficiary Schemes
Same-sex
couples

Other
unmarried
conjugal
partners

Relatives

Friends

Colorado

x

x

x

x

Hawaii

x*

Vermont

Eligibility

Any two unmarried, consenting adults of
sound mind

x

Any two adults unable to marry

x

Any two people unable to marry (or enter
a civil union) and related by blood or by
adoption

Maine

x

x

x

Any two individuals except within some
specified degrees of consanguinity

Maryland

x

x

x

Two cohabiting individuals of any gender
in a mutually caring relationship

D.C.

x

x

x

Any two unmarried individuals in a
committed relationship

x

* Before the introduction of same-sex marriage in the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act.178
As to the material scope of the laws, they can range from very narrow (a law that confers on family members only the right to make
179
to very broad (laws which give nonhealth-related decisions)
traditional families near-comprehensive protection under both private
180
and public law). As shown in Figure 2, new families have not been
equated with married families under any of these schemes: They can only access some private law entitlements or public law benefits through
181
each scheme.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See infra Figure 1.
Id.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Westlaw through 2013 Act 4 2d Spec. Sess.).
See, e.g., 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301(a), (b) (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No,
164).
180. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(c) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg.
Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
181. See infra Figure 2.

2018]

197

THE STRANGE PAIRING

Figure 2. Material Scope of Designated/Reciprocal Beneficiary
Schemes for New Families
Social
Workers’
security,
welfare, or tax compensation
benefits
Colorado

x*

Healthrelated rights

x

x

Intestate Property
rights
rights

x

Hawaii

x**

x

Maine

x

x

Maryland

x***

x

x

Wrongful
death
compensation

Other

x

x

Family and
funeral leave,
miscellaneous
provisions

x

D.C.

x

Family and
funeral leave

Vermont
[repealed]

x

Abuse prevention

* Colorado only gives pensions to public employees, or private employees if the employer
elects to do so. C.R.S. 15-22-105(3)(c).
** Only visitation rights.
*** Tax exemption for property transfers.

1. Hawaii
The Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin (1993)
was the first time a U.S. court ruled that excluding same-sex couples
182
from marriage was unconstitutional. The case was then remanded to
the trial court to determine whether the state action passed muster un183
der strict scrutiny, and the Court found it did not. Pending the appeal
of that decision, Hawaii voters passed a referendum that amended the
state constitution to restrict the definition of marriage to opposite-sex
184
spouses. That litigation was a catalyst for the enactment of Hawaii’s

182. Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples Dependent on Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 1000 (2000) (discussing Baehr); see
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
183. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-CV-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21–22 (Haw. Ct. App.
Dec. 3, 1996).
184.. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
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185

Reciprocal Beneficiary Act of 1997. The law was passed as a concession to conservatives, who hoped that the introduction of a neutral
scheme open to a wider array of couples would satisfy the complaints of
186
same-sex couples.
Hawaii’s law allows any two individuals (who cannot enter into a
valid legal marriage) to designate each other as “reciprocal beneficiaries,”
and thus receive some benefits usually attached exclusively to mar187
riage. The law was meant to apply to couples unable to marry, namely
188
relatives and same-sex couples. By registering with the Department of
Health through a simple form, parties can access a number of benefits
which are typically only enjoyed by married couples, including:
(1) Legal standing to sue for wrongful death and under
domestic violence statutes;
(2) Property and inheritance rights;
(3) Hospital visitation rights;
(4) Family and funeral leave; and
(5) Miscellaneous benefits under state law, such as
government vehicle emergency use, use of the facilities of the
189
University of Hawaii, etc.
Not only does this scheme include insurance benefits and health
decision-making rights, but it also lists other spousal-like unitive bene190
191
fits, such as some limited property rights and rights under succes192
sion law (including the right to an elective share upon death). The
family health insurance benefits (both private and public) and the right

185. Ian Curry-Sumner & Scott Curry-Sumner, Is the Union Civil? Same-sex Marriages,
Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships & Reciprocal Benefits in the USA, 4 UTRECHT L.
REV. 236, 243 (2008).
186. Id. at 243; Eskridge, supra note 128, at 1938.
187. Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, Laws 1997, ch. 383, § 1 (codified in part in
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C) (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220).
188. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220) (listing the requisites of a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 572C-2
(Westlaw through 2018 Act 220) (explaining that non-marital relationships, such as a
widowed mother and son, can now receive rights and benefits).
189. H.B. 118, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997).
190. Eskridge, supra note 128, at 1910 (defining unitive rules as rules that enforce the assumption that the parties in a marriage act as a unit as opposed to separate persons).
191. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §509-2 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220). Property rights
include benefits and obligations related to jointly held property, but do not include
distribution of property or support upon breakdown of the relationship.
192. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §560:2-202 (elective share), §560:2-301 (entitlement of
spouse), §560: 2-802, §560:2-804 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 220).

2018]

THE STRANGE PAIRING

199

to workers’ compensation benefits to reciprocal beneficiaries were the
193
least favorable to employers.
This ambitious scheme was curtailed almost immediately after its
enactment by Hawaii’s Attorney General (who interpreted the worker
medical insurance provision as only applicable to insurance companies,
although the majority of employees are not insured through these com194
panies), the state legislature (who refused to fund the medical insurance program) and the courts (who deemed some state private sector
195
benefit plans preempted). As a result, the law’s most groundbreaking
provisions were almost immediately rendered inapplicable to many of its
196
intended beneficiaries.
2. Vermont
The Vermont reciprocal beneficiaries scheme, which was repealed
197
in 2013, applied to any two people who were unable to marry (or en198
ter into a civil union) and were related by blood or adoption. The
199
scheme was more limited in scope than Hawaii’s. It did not include
200
intestate succession or legal standing to sue for wrongful death. Like201
wise, social or tax benefits were not included in the scheme. It also expressly prevented courts from construing the statute in such a way as “to
create any spousal benefits, protections or responsibilities for reciprocal

193. Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership
and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 267,
at 271 (1998).
194. Hawaii Attorney General, Legal Opinion Letter 97-05 (Aug. 14, 1997) (available at
https://ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/97-05.pdf); Hawaii Attorney
General, Legal Opinion Letter 97-10 (Dec. 2, 1997) (available at https://
ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/97-10.pdf); Curry-Sumner & CurrySumner, supra note 185, at 244.
195. Fisk, supra note 193, at 271.
196. Id.
197. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301(a)(Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
198. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
199. See supra Figure 2; see also Martha M. Ertman, The Ali Principles’ Approach to Domestic Partnership, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 110 n.10 (2001).
200. See id.
201. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Vermont explained in Embree v. Balfanz that the
reciprocal beneficiary is a “family,” not merely a household member for purposes of
the applicability of the Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Statute. This shows a gradual
judicial evolution on the notion of family. See 817 A.2d 6, 9 (2002).
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Upon registration,

(1) Hospital visitation and medical decision-making rights;
(2) Decision-making rights relating to anatomical gifts;
(3) Decision-making rights relating to disposition of remains;
(4) Patient’s bill of rights, which conferred the right to be
informed of a loved one’s diagnosis and prognosis, as well as
visitation rights;
(5) Nursing home patient’s bill of rights, which recognized
the right to privacy during visits; and
(6) Access to the state domestic abuse prevention program
203
and connected reliefs.
The genesis of the Act differed from Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiary Act. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the “statutory benefits, protections, and
security incident to marriage” infringed the equal protection clause of
the Vermont Constitution, but the court left the appropriate remedy to
204
the discretion of the legislature. The government eventually opted for
civil unions, restricted to same-sex couples, in an attempt to preserve the
205
purity of marriage. The legislature also added another layer of protection to confer minimal rights to “residual unions”—those unmarried
206
non-gay couples—as “a polite gesture to conservatives.” The aim was
to reduce the symbolism of recognizing same-sex couples through civil
207
unions.
In the context of reciprocal beneficiary schemes, the Vermont law
stands out because it was limited only to health-related choices and pro208
tection against domestic violence. In any case, the statute did not

202. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301(b) (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
203. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164). The list
does not include advanced directives for health care and end of life. 18 VT. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5263–5278 (Westlaw, repealed 2005, No. 55, § 9).
204. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–89 (1999).
205. Thomas F. Coleman, Reciprocal Beneficiary Laws Mask a Larger Political Battle,
UNMARRIED AMERICA (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/columnone/3-13-06-reciprocal-beneficiaries.htm.
206. Id. (“Because they had a judicial gun to their heads, moderate legislators felt compelled to vote in favor of the comprehensive domestic partnership law, which they
renamed ‘civil union.’ The ‘reciprocal beneficiary’ bill also passed as a polite gesture
to conservatives.”).
207. Id.
208. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Westlaw, repealed 2013, Adj. Sess. No, 164).
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prove to be very popular, and few people benefitted from it before its
209
repeal.
3. Useful Exceptions: Colorado, Maryland, Maine, and
Washington, D.C.
This Article contends that new families should form alliances with
conservative groups to advance their rights, since conservatives are often
210
behind the introduction of alternative regimes to marriage. The following examples are schemes that did not originate from conservative
fringes, yet are worth mentioning as valuable examples of models for
protecting new families.
Colorado’s Designated Beneficiary Act of 2009 (“DBA”) confers
on any two unmarried people important protections in estate- and
211
212
health-related decisions, as well as public law benefits. Pursuant to
the law, a person can be named a “designated beneficiary” by an agree213
ment known as a Designated Beneficiary Agreement, or DBA. Unlike
Hawaii’s statute, where the parties must be legally unable to enter a val214
id marriage in order to register, Colorado has no such restriction. The
law only requires that the two parties be consenting adults of sound
215
mind (i.e., legally competent to enter a valid contract). Although the
scheme has been viewed as an estate-planning tool for intimate (opposite-sex or same-sex) couples who have decided to not marry or enter a
civil union, its reach is much broader: the agreement can be entered into
by two unmarried friends or with any relative, including an adult
216
child.
Unlike the schemes in Hawaii and Vermont, the reform in Colorado constituted a stepping stone to enhancing protections for same-sex

209. Aloni, supra note 118, at 592–93.
210. See supra Introduction.
211. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1)(a), (c), (d) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st
Gen. Assemb.).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(c) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
213. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
214. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
215. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(1) (Westlaw 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
216. See John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 384–85 (2015).
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couples, and the LGBT state advocacy group Equal Rights Colorado
217
urged its introduction. Its protections are relatively cheap and easy to
access, as parties can enter into a DBA by completing one easy form that
218
does not require the assistance of an attorney. Upon designation, the
parties to a DBA can exercise some rights and be entitled to some mar219
riage-like protections, as specified in the agreement. The scheme is also highly flexible: parties can tailor it to their needs and expectations
and confer benefits or privileges without a duty of reciprocity to each
220
other.
The DBA’s default regime—the array of protections that automatically attach to designated beneficiaries—is also the broadest of any cur221
rent scheme. The Colorado law offers legal protections in both private
217. Nancy D. Polikoff, Colorado Designated Beneficiary, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LGBTQ STUDIES 245 (Abbie E. Goldberg ed., 2016).
218. See John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 385 (2015).
219. A sample beneficiary agreement can be found on the website of the City and County
of Denver. See CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, https://www.denvergov.org/content/
dam/denvergov/Portals/777/documents/MarriageCivilUnions/Designated
%20Beneficiary%20Agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). It should be noted
that the DBA can be superseded by any other valid document concerning the specific
right/entitlement: “This designated beneficiary agreement is operative in the absence
of other estate planning documents and will be superseded and set aside to the extent
it conflicts with valid instruments such as a will, power of attorney, or beneficiary
designation on an insurance policy or pension plan.” Id. This aspect brings it much
closer to a contractual model for recognition.
220. Id.
221. Unless otherwise provided, pursuant to the Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-22-105(3), the
DBA conveys the following: (1) “The right to acquire, hold title to, own jointly, or
transfer inter vivos or at death real or personal property,” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-22-105(3)(b) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (2)
the right to receive “(I) Public employees’ retirement systems pursuant to articles 51
to 54.6 of title 24, C.R.S.; (II) Local government firefighter and police pensions;
(III) Insurance policies for life insurance coverage; and (IV) Health insurance policies
or health coverage if the employer of the designated beneficiary elects to provide coverage for designated beneficiaries as dependents,” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22105(3)(c) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (3) The right
to visitation by the other designated beneficiary in a hospital, nursing home, hospice,
or similar health care facility, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(e) (Westlaw
through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (4) The right to act as a proxy
decision-maker or surrogate decision-maker to make medical treatment decisions, as
well as to act as a legal guardian, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(f)
(Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (5) The right to inherit
real or personal property through intestate succession, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1522-105(3)(i) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.); (6) The
right to receive benefits pursuant to the “Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado,”
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(j) (Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of
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222

and public law. Not only does it include health-related decisions and
hospital visitation rights, as in Vermont, but the Act also covers intestate
prerogatives, property rights, workers’ compensation benefits, wrongful
death compensation, and a specified list of public benefits, including
223
health coverage and possible retirement benefits for public employees.
Maryland, Maine, and Washington, D.C. have enacted statutes on
“domestic partnerships” that can also be considered reciprocal benefi224
ciary schemes. In Maryland, two cohabiting individuals of any gender
225
who are in a mutually caring relationship can register for benefits. The
couple’s interdependence is defined under the law by economic interde226
pendence, which can be shown through a variety of evidence, such as
227
a joint bank account statement or a property deed.
Unlike Colorado and Hawaii, Maryland’s law prevents individuals
who are related to each other by blood or marriage, within four degrees
of consanguinity, from registering: It thus extends to a non-conjugal
two-person friendship, but not to a family made up of two relatives or
228
siblings. The statute confers a limited set of rights, including hospital
visitation rights, funeral and burial decisions, and tax exemptions upon
229
property transfer.

222.
223.
224.

225.

226.
227.
228.
229.

71st Gen. Assemb.); (7) The right to have standing to sue for wrongful death on behalf of the other designated beneficiary, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105(3)(k)
(Westlaw through 2018, 2d Reg. Sess. of 71st Gen. Assemb.).
See supra Figure 2.
Id.
S.785, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009); 18-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-910
(Westlaw though 2017); D.C. CODE § 32–701 (Westlaw through Oct. 11, 2018).
Wisconsin had a similar statute, but has shelved it since the Obergefell decision guaranteed the right of same-sex marriage. Obergefell chronicles the genealogy of these
schemes to provide an alternative to same-sex marriage. With the passage of the Wisconsin 2017-2019 biennial budget, WIS. STAT. § 66.0510 was introduced, preventing all municipalities, counties, and school districts from “offering employee benefit
plan coverage to domestic partners of employees as of January 1, 2018.” See Wisconsin
Budget Imposes Changes to Domestic Partner Coverage, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
CORPORATION
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.ebcflex.com/Education/Compliance
Buzz/tabid/1140/ArticleID/528/Wisconsin-Budget-Imposes-Changes-to-DomesticPartner-Coverage-January-1-2018.aspx.
MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(a)(Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.) (“two
individuals who . . . (4) Agree to be in a relationship of mutual interdependence in
which each individual contributes to the maintenance and support of the other individual and the relationship.”).
MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(a)(Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.).
MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(b)(2)(Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.).
MD CODE ANN., HEALTH § 6-101(a)(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess.).
S. 785, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
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In a similar vein, Maine’s domestic partnership law allows any two
individuals to register but maintains existing statutory prohibitions on
polygamy and partnership between two people within specified degrees
230
of consanguinity. The statute grants only some prerogatives in case
231
of death of the partner, namely rights of inheritance and decision232
making about the disposal of human remains.
Finally, D.C.’s domestic partnership regime is open to any two
unmarried individuals in a committed relationship and extends to non233
romantic relationships. This broader reach (relative to marriage) was
stressed by the D.C. Committee on the Judiciary in response to at234
tempts to repeal the scheme. The status confers limited rights, espe235
cially health-related rights and privileges, such as visitation rights, the
right for D.C. government employees to request funeral and family
236
leave, and the right to opt for self-financed family health insurance
237
coverage.
4. Summary
All of the described schemes would offer legal protections for new
families. Colorado’s DBA offers the best protections due to its broad
application and the wide array of benefits it confers. Laudably, all of the
schemes seem to shift the focus away from romantic, sexual relationships
in that they do not list fidelity duties. Instead they tend to offer a set of
238
rights centered on health-related decision-making and succession. But
since they rarely include social security or tax benefits, the schemes stop
short of fully addressing the problem of redistributive justice that is possible through government programs and only partially protect new fami239
lies.

230. See H.B. 1152, 2004 121st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2004), citing to 19-A ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 701.2 (Westlaw though 2017).
231. See 18-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-102, 5-311(b)(2-A) (Westlaw though 2017).
232. 18-A REV. ME. STAT. ANN. § 2843-A(5) (Westlaw through 2017).
233. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32–701 to 710(4) (Westlaw through July 27, 2018).
234. See Letter from Phil Mendelson, Councilmember, Comm. on Pub. Safety & the Judiciary, to All Councilmembers (Nov. 10, 2009) (http://www.glaa.org/archive/2009/
b18-482committeereport1110.pdf).
235. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-704.
236. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-705.
237. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-706.
238. See supra Figure 2.
239. Leckey, supra note 53, at 3.
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Many of these schemes include benefits that are free, such as medi240
cal decision-making prerogatives or visitation rights. By contrast, only
half the schemes examined above also offer rights under private law,
241
such as intra-familial transfer of property. Because this benefit costs
the state a loss in tax revenue (and thus is not free), it is a bolder reform.
The need to recognize public law benefits, in addition to the foregoing,
looms large in this analysis and will be a decisive factor in assessing future policies. The tendency in current schemes is not to include direct
outlays to subsidize new family networks through social security, welfare, and tax benefits, but the path forward will need to include these in
order to offer all families equal status.
B. The Adult Interdependent Relationships Act of Alberta
In 2002, Alberta introduced a new legal status for couples through
242
the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act (“AIRA”). The status—as
“adult interdependent partners” or “AIPs”—can be conferred either by
contractual agreement or ascription, and is open to any two adults in an
243
interdependent relationship. AIRA confers on new families many of
244
the rights, obligations, and benefits of marriage. The phrase “adult interdependent partners” (AIPs) is now added to many Canadian laws and
provincial programs, and it continues to offer these couples benefits—
245
both public and private—that were previously reserved to spouses.
In the public sphere, AIPs receive the same extended health care
benefits as married couples, where one partner’s age is above 65 years
246
old. Under the Alberta Workers Compensation Act, compensation
247
following the death of a worker is owed to AIPs as well as spouses. In
the private law sphere, AIPs are given the right to inherit property from

240. See supra Figure 2 (showing that all schemes check the box of health-related rights,
although Hawaii only allows hospital visitation rights).
241. Id.
242. See generally Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c. A-4.5 (Can.).
243. Id.
244. See ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶ 186.
245. Id. (“More than 130 different Alberta statutes and regulations now include the words
‘adult interdependent partner.’ Generally, legislation extends the same rights, benefits, and obligations to adult interdependent partners and spouses. Adult interdependent partners and spouses have the same rights and obligations relating to support, intestate succession, maintenance and support from an estate, and for many
other purposes.”).
246. Id. at ¶ 186.
247. See, e.g., Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c W-15, §§ 49, 71 (Can.).

206

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER

&

LAW

[Vol. 25:161
248

a deceased partner under the same circumstances as a spouse. AIPs also have the right to inherit a share of an estate assigned by law, irrespec249
tive of the content of the will. An AIP can also claim “spousal” sup250
port obligations. However, a major gap between married couples and
AIPs persists in the division of property upon dissolution of the relationship. Unlike spouses, AIPs do not enjoy a right to equal property
251
division of “non-exempt” property upon separation.
The enactment of the law followed the Canadian Supreme Court
decision that discrimination based on sexual orientation was constitutionally impermissible under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free252
253
doms. Shortly thereafter, an Alberta surrogate court held that a separate law, denying survivorship benefits for LGBT partners, was
254
unconstitutional. The two decisions fueled a massive mobilization by
255
socially conservative Christians in Alberta. The groups coalesced to
pass AIRA in order to dilute protection for same-sex couples by creating
a registration system that would be open to a wide range of non-marital
256
couples. It is thus ironic that AIRA, which was originally intended to
marginalize a subset of non-normative families (LGBT families), has become a guarantor of the rights of nearly all non-normative families.
The system created by AIRA is a mixed one. It sets forth two different models of recognition for non-married couples:
248. See Vogel LLP Lawyers, Adult Interdependent Relationships and Estates, 114 ACTLA’S
“THE BARRISTER” MAGAZINE, (Dec. 1, 2014) https://www.vogel-llp.ca/resources/.
249. Id.
250. Cohabiting Relationships and Adult Interdependent Partners, CALGARY LEGAL
GUIDANCE,
http://clg.ab.ca/programs-services/dial-a-law/cohabiting-relationshipsand-adult-independent-partners-2/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
251. The automatic right to equal property division is established under the Matrimonial
Property Act, R.S.A. 2000, c M-8 (Can.), which only applies to married couples.
252. Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, (2004) 3 S.C.R. 698; Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 44.
253. A surrogate court typically has jurisdiction over the wills and estates of deceased people. In Alberta, The Court of Queen’s Bench oversees surrogate matters. The Court
of Queen’s Bench, Jurisdiction and Governance, ALBERTA COURTS, https://
albertacourts.ca/qb/about/jurisdiction-and-governance (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
254. Johnson v. Sand, (2001) 91 Alta. L.R. 3d 249 (Alta. Surr. Ct.) (citing to M v. H,
(1999) 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.)) (finding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
definition of “common law spouse” is unconstitutionally contrary to Section 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
255. Bala, supra note 170.
256. Id.; see also ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at 208 (“A few respondents opposed [the recommendation that property division rules should apply to
adult interdependent partners] because they consider AIRA as a whole to be flawed.
In their view, AIRA was designed to avoid explicitly recognizing same sex relationships for political reasons. They believe AIRA is not based on sound policy.”)
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1. Contractual model: parties can sign a written agreement to
257
become adult interdependent partners;
2. Ascription model: parties acquire the AIP status if they live
in a three-year, interdependent relationship or a relationship
“of some permanence” where there is a child—as long as
there is no formal, written intent to not acquire the AIP
258
status. As previously noted, however, persons related to
each other by blood or adoption are not eligible for ascription
and may only become adult interdependent partners by
259
written agreement.
As a general matter, to become AIPs there must be a “relationship
260
of interdependence.” The condition is met where parties “(i) share
one another’s lives, (ii) are emotionally committed to one another, and
261
(iii) function as an economic and domestic unit.” At this point,
despite the neutral language seen above, the Legislature of Alberta added
262
conjugality in the scheme. To determine when parties “function as an
economic and domestic unit,” the following elements must be taken
into account:
(a) whether or not the persons have a conjugal
relationship;
(b) the degree of exclusivity of the relationship;
(c) the conduct and habits of the persons in respect of
household activities and living arrangements;
(d) the degree to which the persons hold themselves out
to others as an economic and domestic unit;
(e) the degree to which the persons formalize their legal
obligations, intentions and responsibilities toward one
another;
(f) the extent to which direct and indirect contributions
have been made by either person to the other or to their
mutual well-being;

257. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A–4.5, §3(1)(b) (Can.).
258. Adult Interdependent Relationships Actt §3(1)(a).
259. Since these partnerships are formalized through a private contract, there are no statistics on the number of contracted AIPs since the enactment of the law.
260. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A–4.5, §§1(1)(f), 3–4 (Can.).
261. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(1)(f).
262. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(2). This move was perhaps unintentional
and the result of the passivity with which the Legislature relied on the previous case
law to establish a common law marriage.
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(g) the
degree
of
financial
dependence
or
interdependence and any arrangements for financial support
between the persons;
(h) the care and support of children;
263
(i) the ownership, use, and acquisition of property.
The Alberta Legislature’s drafting decisions—specifically, the decision to include conjugality as an element of a domestic unit—seem to
constrain what qualifies as an AIP to the realm of the romantic, conjugal
264
couple. While criteria (c) through (i) tend to be applicable to nonconjugal interdependent relationships, criteria (a) and (b) clearly point
to conjugality as the marker of familyhood. This aspect is worrisome in
that it excludes non-conjugal couples by definition.
However, the interpretation of conjugality in Alberta’s courts indi265
cates that “conjugality” is not synonymous with “sexual activity.” In
Alberta, conjugality has been interpreted to include a range of relation266
ships, including a less intimate, non-sexual relationship. Pursuant to
this case law, the absence of a “physical relationship” or a shared bed
was not determinative; courts have been satisfied that conjugality existed
when parties “enjoyed each other’s company, dined together, sometimes
267
slept together, traveled together and visited mutual friends together.”
As in the case of conjugality, the Legislature’s condition that a relationship have a high degree of “exclusivity” is borrowed from the se268
mantics of marriage. Exclusivity has little heuristic value for nonconjugal couples; it also does little to identify non-traditional conjugal
couples, whose parties can be deeply committed and yet non269
exclusive. As a purely textual matter, the choice to list these criteria at

263. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(2) (emphasis added).
264. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act §1(2).
265. See, e.g., Riley Estate (Re), (2014) 603 A.R. 1 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (claiming relief as the
beneficiary of the deceased estate based on the existence of an exclusive relationship);
Kiernan v. Stach Estate, (2009) 465 A.R. 261 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
266. See, e.g., Riley Estate (Re), (2014) 603 A.R. 1, at ¶ 96 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (claiming
relief as the beneficiary of the deceased estate based on the existence of an exclusive
relationship); Kiernan v. Stach Estate, (2009) 465 A.R. 261, at ¶ 45 (Can. Alta.
Q.B.).
267. Riley Estate (Re), 603 A.R. at para. 95.
268. See Jane Adolphe, The Principles and the Canada’s “Beyond Conjugality” Report: The
Move Toward Abolition of State Marriage Laws, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION 355 (Robin Fretwell ed., 2006) (citing Cormac Burke, Object of Matrimonial Consent – A Personalist Analysis, 9 F. 39, 70 (1998)).
269. Rosenbury, supra note 60 at 229–30.
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the top of the list is controversial in that these requirements essentially
percolate down—they can affect the interpretation of the remaining
ones. However, lower courts have laid out a holistic approach to determining whether parties constitute an economic and domestic unit, with
270
no single factor carrying more weight than the others. This approach
helps mitigate the effects of this drafting decision and should, in principle, allow courts to extend the scheme to families other than conjugal
families. Still, from the face of the text, it is clear that the “ideal” adult
interdependent partnership would be an opposite-sex or same-sex con271
jugal couple, either raising a child or cohabitating for three years.
That concern that only conjugal couples would take advantage of
272
the scheme has been realized. A legal analysis I conducted over a sample of 50 cases that address the Alberta courts’ application of AIRA reveals that lawsuits have exclusively been brought by conjugal couples.
The results of this analysis are confirmed by a recent survey conducted
by the Alberta Law Reform Institute, which found essentially no evi273
dence of non-conjugal AIPs. This might be evidence that Canadian
courts emphasize a specific romantic, conjugal notion of partnership. If
so, it suggests that there is an incentive for couples to frame themselves
as if they were conjugal, romantic couples—even if they are not. The
trend could also be linked to a lack of awareness that it’s possible for
non-conjugal couples to enter formal relationships. While this Article is
270. Kiernan v. Stach Estate, 2009 ABQB 150, para 42 (Can.).
271. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶ 243 (“Whether or not sexual
relations are a necessary part of a conjugal relationship, it is likely that the vast majority of adult interdependent relationships are between partners who have or had sexual
relations.”).
272. See, e.g., Knight v. Wowk, 2015 ABPC 286 (Can.) (plaintiff seeking an order requiring the former common-law partner to pay spousal support); R.F.T. v. O.K.G., 2007
ABPC 70 (Can.) (plaintiff filing an application for child support from the conjugal
partner and biological parent of the child).
273. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 215, 241:
“At many of our presentations and roundtables, we asked lawyers about
their experience with non-conjugal adult interdependent partners. We
asked whether anyone had encountered a case where a non-conjugal relationship was alleged or found to be an adult interdependent relationship.
Many lawyers with years of experience in family law or wills and estates
attended our presentations and roundtables, but almost no one indicated
they had encountered such a case. . . There are no reported cases where
unrelated roommates who did not have sexual relations were found to be
adult interdependent partner. When we asked lawyers at our meetings
and roundtables whether they were aware of non-conjugal adult interdependent partners, they did not identify any cases involving unrelated
roommates.”.
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not the proper venue to engage in inquiries over causation, it is still
worth flagging this trend and the ways in which the AIRA is not serving
non-conjugal unions.
Despite these findings, I believe AIRA contributes to a healthy culture of non-conjugality because it makes these relationships visible in
the eyes of the law. The law can change the way the parties themselves
think of their relationships—not as something aberrant or incidental
but as relationships that enjoy social and juridical relevance. AIRA can
help to foster the culture it seeks to regulate.
A recent case in Alberta is instructive for the fostering of such culture. There, two interdependent siblings in Alberta sought an extension
of the federal Canada Pension Plan survivor’s pension—a public bene274
fit—to their relationship. Although rejected on jurisdictional grounds,
the case shows the increased visibility of new families. Laws like AIRA
can help these relationships self-identify as one group, capable of advancing its own agenda.
C. Conservative Bills in Alabama and Missouri Move Toward a
Contractual Model
When the United States Supreme Court handed down Obergefell v.
Hodges in 2015, many probate judges across the country responded by
275
refusing to issue marriage licenses entirely. They argued for doing
away with state-sponsored marriage altogether and leaving in its place
276
civil contracts. The goal was to expand the availability of civil contracts and make marriage a private institution.
To that end, many state legislatures began to introduce socially
277
conservative bills including Oklahoma’s (which proposed replacing
278
marriage licenses with common law marriage affidavits), Alabama’s

274. E. H. v. Minister of Emp’t & Soc. Dev., 2017 SSTGDIS 3, No. GP-16-2741
(Can.).
275. Michael C. Dorf, Does the Constitution Permit a State to Abolish Marriage?, VERDICT
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/03/21/constitution-permit-stateabolish-marriage.
276. Id.
277. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See Melissa Murray, Obergefell v.
Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1207 (2016), for a discussion
on the ruling; see also Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term – Comment: A
New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 162–79
(2015).
278. H.B. 1125, 2017 Sess. (Okla. 2017), http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?
Bill=HB1125&Session=1600.
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(which proposed replacing marriage licenses with civil contracts), and
Missouri (which proposed replacing marriage licenses with civil un280
281
ions). None of the bills passed. Although motivated by conservative
animus to same-sex marriage and reluctance to implement the Supreme
Court’s Obergefell decision, the bills also offered a possible solution to
the lack of protections for new families.
The Oklahoma legislation aimed to replace civil marriage with
282
common law marriage affidavits or marriage certificates. The proposal
passed in the House and then received a second reading in the Senate,
283
but never got off the ground. In the version of the bill approved by
the Oklahoma House of Representatives, the state would no longer issue
284
marriage licenses. Instead, it would only “record” marriage certifi285
286
cates or common law marriage affidavits through its clerks, provided that the couple met all the legal conditions for entering into a valid
287
marriage. The officiating of marriage ceremonies would therefore be
288
left to private actors and religious communities.
In Alabama, Senate Bill 143 was approved by the Senate on March
289
25, 2016, but it did not come to a vote in the Alabama House before
290
the end of the legislative session. It was revived as Senate Bill 20 in
291
2017, but suffered the same fate. In the original version, marriage

279. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018; see also S.B.
20, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB20/2017 for the previous
version of the bill.
280. H.B. 1434, 2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018; see
also H.B. 62, 2017 Sess. (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/text/HB62/2017 for
the first version of the bill.
281. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Divorcing Marriage and the State Post-Obergefell, in THE
CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 415 (2018).
282. The Oklahoma bill is therefore different from the bills proposed in Alabama and
Missouri, which aimed to replace marriage licenses with civil contracts.
283. Id.
284. H.R. 1125, 2015 Sess. (Okla. 2015), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/201516%20ENGR/hB/HB1125%20ENGR.PDF.
285. H.R. 1125.
286. H.R. 1125 § (7)(E).
287. Id. The bill would have made civil contracts available to all adult couples by erasing
the requirement that marriage is between one person and “a person of the opposite
sex.”
288. Greg Horton, Oklahoma Bill Would Give Clergy Power Over Marriage Licenses,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2015, 4:18 PM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/12/oklahoma-gay-marriage_n_6858424.html.
289. S.B. 143, 2016 Sess. (Ala. 2016), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB143/2016.
290. S.B. 143.
291. S.B. 20, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB20/2017. The new
bill was reviewed and approved 9-0 on February 23, 2017 by the Senate Judicial
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292

licenses would be replaced with “marriage contracts.” The 2017 bill
scaled back that proposal, and instead abolished the issuance of a license
293
and solemnization as requisites for entering a valid marriage. Under
the new bill, probate judges were required to accept affidavits—attesting
that the parties were consenting, unmarried, unrelated adults—as
294
official records of marriage.
This reform, like that in Oklahoma, was likely driven by the desire
“to excuse government officials who oppose same-sex marriage on religious or other grounds from having to issue marriage licenses to same295
sex couples.” The battle over refusing to issue marriage licenses postObergefell was particularly heated in Alabama, and reached its peak in
June 2016, when Chief Justice Roy S. Moore of the Supreme Court of
Alabama issued an administrative order to Alabama lower court judges
296
directing them to disobey the Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell.
297
The order led to the Chief Justice’s suspension for ethics violations.
Ahead of the legislative session in 2017, Missouri representatives
filed House Bill 62, which replaced the word “marriage” with the term
298
“contract of domestic union” everywhere it appeared in the state code.
When it failed to get approval, the representatives pre-filed a similar bill
299
for 2018. At the time of publication of this Article, that bill was again
300
stalled in the House. The law omitted any reference to parties’ genders, and allowed any two consenting adults to have their “contract of
301
domestic union” registered for notification purposes. As in Oklahoma
and Alabama, the law was driven by the desire to relieve clerks from of-

292.

293.
294.
295.
296.

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Committee. It was later approved by the state senate on March 8, 2017, by a 22-6
vote. Again, it did not gain the final approval of the state house.
Fretwell Wilson, supra note 281. The term “contract is not synonymous with “license.” With licenses, the state confers the status and polices access to it. With contracts, parties can freely decide to accept the status once eligibility conditions are met.
S.B. 13, 2017 Sess. (Ala. 2017), http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/Searc
hableInstruments/2018RS/PrintFiles/SB13-int.pdf.
Id. at § 2.
Dorf, supra note 275.
See Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Chief Justice, Suspended Over Gay Marriage Order, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/
roy-moore-alabama-chief-justice.html.
Id.
H.B. 62, 99th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg, Sess (Mo. 2017),
https://legiscan.com/MO/
text/HB62/2017.
H.B. 1434, 99th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/
bill/HB1434/2018.
Id.
H.B. 62; H.B. 1434.
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ficiating marriages that went against their personal and religious convic302
tions.
In all three states, the act of registering the relationship with the
government was only for notification purposes; the registration itself did
303
not confer any rights or obligations. This limited role of registration
was a crucial change. Under the contractual models like those proposed
in Alabama and Missouri, a new couple becomes legally partnered or
304
“married” upon stipulation of the contract. The legal status attaches
not at the moment the state approved the transaction, as is the case with
marriage, but at the moment the contract is executed (Missouri) or the
305
marriage is executed (Alabama). It is thus the contract/affidavit alone
that triggers the legal consequences of “being married.”
These bills establish a path forward for new families. In particular,
the bills in Missouri and Alabama establish a variation on the traditional
contractual model that is notable for two reasons:
(1) Unlike a pure contractual model, the private law
instruments proposed in Missouri and Alabama would bind
not just the parties themselves but also the government and
306
third parties, such as insurance companies and employers.
It is the state that confers upon the parties the power to

302. See generally TJ Martinell, Missouri Bill Would Eliminate State Marriage Licenses,
10TH AMEND. CTR.: TENTHER BLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), http://
blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2016/12/missouri-bill-would-eliminate-statemarriage-licenses/; see also Dorf, supra note 275.
303. For Missouri, see H.B. 62, 99th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg, Sess (Mo. 2017), https://
legiscan.com/MO/text/HB62/2017 (providing certain provisions relating to all private law entitlements, which are triggered by the contract, and stating that in order to
be eligible for spouse benefits, “the surviving spouse and the deceased member shall
have been parties to a contract of domestic union on the date of the personal injury resulting in the member’s death or on the date of onset of the disease resulting in the
member’s death.”) (emphasis added). For Alabama, see S.B. 20, 2017 Sess. (Ala.
2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB20/2017 (clarifying that the marriage is valid
on the date the marriage is executed by both parties, and that registration comes only
later). For Oklahoma, see H.B. 1125, 2017 Sess. (Okla. 2017), http://www.
oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HB1125&Session=1600 (providing that the clerk
of the court “shall make a complete record of the marriage certificate or affidavit.”).
304. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018;
H.B. 1434, 2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018.
305. S. 13, 2018 Sess. (Ala. 2018), https://legiscan.com/AL/bill/SB13/2018; H.B. 1434,
2018 Sess. (Mo. 2018), https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB1434/2018.
306. See H.B. 62, 99th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg, Sess (Mo. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MO/
text/HB62/2017 (providing a host of public law entitlements).
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acquire the status of “married couple” and the benefits that
307
follow; and
(2) It saves the parties the trouble of articulating a
comprehensive regime, as they can enjoy the default legal
framework of marriage. This overcomes many of the
problems associated with private contracting, such that the
benefits flowing from the contract could be as flexible,
308
efficient, and comprehensive as that of traditional marriage.
Formal recognition of non-traditional families, such as same-sex
309
couples and polyamorous relationships, is a source of heated debate.
The decision to dignify some relationships and not others is delicate and
ideologically driven, and it involves essential choices that touch on issues
310
of law, public policy, moral philosophy, and political theory. When
the state accords statuses, it sanctions familyhood and confers the ex311
pressive benefits of recognition. It is therefore an added benefit of
these contractual models that they avoid seeking the state’s express approval of the relationship. This approach dodges the social conflict that
is intrinsic in the highly contentious decision about which relationships
312
to recognize.
I understand the tensions with embracing laws that are designed
with oppression in mind. But queer activists should be mindful of
Wundt’s “heterogony of ends” principle, which argues that a group of
people—even one with different or changing motivations—can still ad313
vance one goal. The laws proposed in Missouri, Oklahoma, and Ala-

307. By contrast, a pure private law model does not bind the government or third parties.
See Leckey, supra note 53, at 12.
308. Id. (“A difficulty with private ordering in the family setting is that the ordinary rules
of contract may prove less adaptable than legislated family regimes. For example, legislated regimes provide a means to vary support obligations where circumstances have
changed, whereas a private agreement to pay support may not have provided a way to
respond to changes.”).
309. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE 135–39 (2012); SEX,
PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997);
see also METZ, supra note 22.
310. See generally, Nussbaum, supra note 13.
311. Id. at 671–72.
312. See id.
313. The expression “heterogony of ends” (in the original German version, Heterogonie der
Zwecke) was coined by the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt argues that human
behavior has ever-changing goals, and thus, that which was the original purpose for
engaging in certain conduct can be complemented or replaced by a later purpose. See
Voce “eterogenesi dei fini” in TRECCANI DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.
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bama have certain positive attributes. They confer a legal status without
regard to the gender of the parties. They preserve the default regime,
and thereby avoid some of the most onerous aspects of private contracts.
They exalt individual autonomy by leaving entirely to the parties the
decision of whether to enter into a marriage and when a partnership
314
should trigger legal effects.
These laws were not perfect. If enacted, recognition would still
have been restricted to couples “eligible to marry,” such that two blood
relatives would not have been protected. They were also limited to relationships involving two individuals, but no more. These bills can therefore serve as models for the path forward, but need progressive amendments.
Section III responds to criticisms about recognition of new families, and offers some notes and recommendations on how the political
action of queer activists should be reframed to foster family legal pluralism.
Section III
The Way Forward: Reframing Political Action
A. Anticipating Criticisms to Recognition
In grappling with legal solutions to protect new families, I have
taken for granted that these families ought to obtain legal recognition.
But should they? Recognition often comes with a cost—either actual
(financial) or metaphorical (the cost of assimilation)—to both the
family and society. This is one of a handful of objections to legally
315
recognizing new families. I will anticipate these potential objections
and pose counterarguments to them.
The first of these objections can be abstracted from the debate
within feminist legal scholarship on the privatization of care, which posits an argument about the risk that recognition might transfer care duties from the state to private individuals. A second criticism warns
against the financial cost associated with recognition. A third one flags

treccani.it/enciclopedia/eterogenesi-dei-fini_%28Dizionario-di-filosofia%29/
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2018).
314. Again, registering a relationship with the state clerk does not, itself, produce legal effects, but instead serves only to inform the government of the existence of the relationship.
315. See infra Section III.A.1–A.5.
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the problems associated with normalization and assimilation of new
families into existing family categories. A fourth raises concerns that
people will exploit existing regimes to strategically gain benefits. Finally,
I will examine the argument that recognizing new families, especially
non-conjugal ones, would not be in the best interest of any children in
such a family.
1. Does Recognition Mean that Care is “Privatized”?
One camp in the debate around the recognition of new families
opposes recognition of new families on the theory that doing so would
result in a shift in caregiving responsibilities from the state onto family
316
members. Critics are concerned that the burden to care for elderly or
dependent individuals—a burden that would otherwise be borne by the
317
state—would shift to the newly-recognized family member(s). I understand this concern, but I believe that the dangers associated with
recognition are outweighed by the advantages that flow from it.
Privatization of care is not unique to the question of new families,
and refers generally to the externalization of caregiving duties from the
318
public to the private sphere. This is widely acknowledged as a problem in feminist literature, political philosophy, and family law scholar319
ship. This side of the debate is focused on the state’s financial incentives to recognize new families and enforce key private law consequences
320
of recognition, like spousal support. Under this line of thinking, policymakers are interested in extending private obligations between citizens
321
in order to avoid additional government outlay. Thus, the more types
of families that are legislatively recognized, the more providers of infor322
mal care are called on to provide private law support obligations.
316. See generally Susan B. Boyd & Claire F.L. Young, From Same-Sex to No Sex?: Trends
Towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in Canada, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
757, 784 (2003); BRIAN SLOAN, INFORMAL CAREERS AND PRIVATE LAW 213 (2013).
317. SLOAN, supra note 316 at 136–206.
318. See e.g., BRENDA COSSMAN & JUDY FUDGE, PRIVATIZATION, LAW, AND THE
CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 18 (2002).
319. Id.
320. Boyd & Young, supra note 316, at 784 (2003) (“offload[ing] responsibility onto
those private relationships . . . result[s] in more expectations being made of those relationships in terms of taking care of ‘their own’.”).
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., Ivana Isailovic, Same Sex but Not the Same: Same-Sex Marriage in the United
States and France and the Universalist Narrative, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 267, 295 (2018)
(making the argument with respect to recognition of same-sex couples through marriage).
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From time to time this concern is realized. For instance, in enacting the Designated Beneficiary Act, the Colorado legislature openly
acknowledged that the goal of wider recognition was to “reduc[e] reli323
ance on public programs and services.” Another example is the Su324
preme Court of Canada’s decision in M v. H, delivered by Justice
Frank Iacobucci: “[T]he objectives of the statute were to provide for the
equitable resolution of economic disputes when intimate relationships
between financially interdependent individuals break down, and to alle325
viate the burden on the public purse to provide for dependent spouses.”
Of course, it is more complex than that. Many scholars have argued that the financial incentives flow the other way: that the state has a
financial interest to ignore new families so that it does not have to pro326
vide tax breaks, social assistance, and other subsidies. Often upon
recognition there are a number of public law benefits that flow to the
327
relationship. In Egan v. Canada (1995), the Supreme Court of Canada found that withholding old-age security allowance to a gay couple
328
was constitutionally permissible. In so concluding, Justice Sopinka argued that the “government must be accorded some flexibility in extending social benefits and does not have to be proactive in recognizing new
social relationships. It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there
329
are unlimited funds to address the needs of all.”
The problem is that both sides of the debate are right. Recognition
entails both the privatization of care through the enforcement of private
obligations and an increase in public expenditures through the extension
of social benefits. However, the increase of public outlays is often counterbalanced by a commensurate increase in tax revenue and a reduction
323. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-102(1)(d) (2009) (“The power of individuals to
care for one another and take action to be personally responsible for themselves and
their loved ones is of tremendous societal benefit, enabling self-determination and reducing reliance on public programs and services.”).
324. M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
325. M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 (emphasis added).
326. For an overview of this side of the debate, see Harder, supra note 2, at 652–53; see
also Katherine Spensieri, Proxy-mate: Revitalizing the Spousal Support Regime for Nonconjugal Adult Personal Relationships and the Case of Caregiving, 36 CAN. FAM. L.Q.
107, 112 (2016).
327. In the wake of the Windsor and Obergefell decisions extending legal protections to
same-sex couples, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is slowly widening the
notion of family through interpretative guidance documents. See United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., GN 00210.004—SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS—NON-MARITAL LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS (2016), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210004.
328. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 516 (Can.).
329. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 516.
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in social welfare benefits as a result of the increased income of the par330
ties.
The “private-public responsibility dichotomy” deserves a separate
331
and much deeper discussion. I am unpersuaded by arguments that legal recognition should not be conferred because it would result in privatized care. The caregivers who seek legal recognition as a family do so
intentionally. If they believe that they would be better off by gaining
recognition—or that recognition is vital to their equality and dignity in
the public space—then I do not think abstract ideas about duties of care
are sufficiently compelling to withhold recognition. The concern that
private law obligations would privatize care is valid, but not substantial.
2. The Cost of Recognition to New Families:
A Pragmatic, Autonomy-Driven Approach
332

Legal recognition often comes with a price. Sometimes, legal
333
recognition will make families financially worse-off. This is frequently
the case with government programs that are means-tested, as in the case
334
of Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the U.S. In
such programs both spouses’ finances are considered to determine eligibility, such that a couple’s married status might cause them to be ineligible (they make too much money), where before, as two individuals,
335
they might have qualified. Extending recognition to new families
could similarly cost them their welfare or social security benefits.
It matters also if the benefit is conferred through a default regime.
Without a default regime, parties bear the burden of protecting themselves through contracts, power of attorney documents, and other legal
tools. By the same token, a default regime imports certain presumptions
from traditional marriage, such as mutual trust (in the context of evi-

330. See infra Section III.A.2. Kim Brooks reports that taxpayers in Canada often argue
that they are not in a spousal relationship because such status would “reduce access to
child tax benefits, the goods and services tax credit, or the equivalent-to-spouse credit, all of which require consideration of the income of the taxpayer’s spouse.” See Kim
Brooks, Cameos from the Margins of Conjugality, in AFTER LEGAL EQUALITY 111
(Robert Leckey ed., 2015).
331. Spensieri, supra note 326.
332. See Aloni, supra note 91, at 1285–86
333. Polikoff, supra note 26, at 548.
334. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 2102 (2017), https://
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.21/handbook-toc21.html.
335. Id. at § 2113, 2122.3 (B).
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dentiary privileges), income pooling (in the field of tax law), social bene336
fits, and parenting responsibilities.
This argument has more or less traction depending on if the recognition is sought, as in the case of a contractual model, or is ascribed onto the partners. When recognition is the result of a deliberate choice, it
might well be the case that parties are ready to lose a public benefit—
because they anticipate they will gain others, or because they perceive
that recognition will be better for them long-term. Likewise, financial
costs are particularly troublesome when neither partner chooses to gain
recognition, as in the case of pure ascription. Recognition is not synonymous with protection. I am in favor of according more legal benefits to
non-traditional families, but I am concerned about reckless progressiv337
ism that would confer a legal status onto parties who do not seek it.
Therefore, concerns about costs should be reframed as one touching upon issues of personal autonomy. An approach more respectful of
personal autonomy must acknowledge the possible adverse effects of legal recognition and let families decide whether to take on these consequences. Of course, it is the state’s responsibility to enable parties to
make this decision by providing a formal scheme into which they can
freely enter.
3. The Assimilation Conundrum

338

339

Marriage is a normalizing force. As more individuals decide to
get married, the choice to not get married becomes more “abnormal,”
340
which can be detrimental to unmarried couples. Critics argue that legal recognition of new families has the same result. In seeking recognition, a non-normative relationship risks being drawn into the sphere of

336. Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its Relationship to Family Law, 129 HARV.
L. REV. FORUM 197, 202 (2016).
337. See supra Section I.B.
338. The next three subsections are named after episodes of the seventh season of the CBS
television show The Big Bang Theory (broadcast Sept. 26, 2013 through May 15,
2014).
339. I use Foucault’s notion of normalization here. For further discussion, see Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalization: Rhetorics of Justification of the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97,
100 n.7 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenas eds., 2001).
340. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 25, at 272.
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influence of the heterosexual marriage, and thereby losing its distinctive
341
qualities.
While this concern about assimilation has been frequently voiced
342
in regards to same-sex couples seeking access to marriage, it is not yet
clear that recognition through a marriage alternative would yield similar
normalizing effects. I believe that it would, albeit to a lesser extent.
Non-conjugal relationships such as cohabiting relatives provide an illustrative example: While these relationships suffer from comparative invisibility in the legal space, in the few cases where they have gained official
343
recognition, they had to comply with marriage-like criteria. Consider
Alberta’s Adult Interdependent Relationships Act of 2003, which permits any two people to be recognized as Adult Interdependent Partners
344
(AIPs) through an agreement or ascription. As outlined above, for a
couple to be recognized as such a partnership, they must bear the following characteristics:
(i) share one another’s lives,
(ii) [be] emotionally committed to one another, and
345
(iii) function as an economic and domestic unit,”
which includes a conjugal relationship and a “degree of
346
exclusivity.”
As previously discussed, under the holistic approach of the Alberta
family courts, lack of marital-like features such as conjugality or fidelity
need not prevent formal recognition where other relevant criteria are
347
present. However, the inclusion of these factors, along with the mandatory dyadic structure—that an adult interdependent partnership can
only be between two people—suggests that the legislation drafters could
348
hardly do without the traditional features of marital relationships.

341. See SYCAMORE supra note 25; Cossman supra note 27; Ettelbrick supra note 25;
Feinberg supra note 25; Polikoff supra note 26; Robson & Valentine supra note 30;
Scott supra note 20.
342. See Cossman, supra note 27 (“The radical pluralist position argues that our relationships do not fit the model of the heterosexual family. Gay and lesbian relationships
are not functionally equivalent to heterosexual relationships—they are not necessarily
based on sexual monogamy or emotional exclusivity.”).
343. This is especially evident in the case of the Alberta’s scheme, infra Section B.
344. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, §1 (Can.).
345. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, §1(1)(f) (Can.).
346. Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, §1(2) (Can.).
347. Kiernan v. Stach Estate, 2009 ABQB 150, para 42 (Can.).
348. This includes factors such as conjugality, exclusivity, etc. See infra Section II.B.
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From this example we can conclude that the danger of assimilation
into the marital norm is always present. But it is not a lost cause, and
with some awareness on the part of the legislature, this concern can be
mitigated. Lawmakers should craft legal remedies so that they avoid including unnecessary and normative eligibility criteria, such as conjugality and exclusivity.
4. The Adverse-Selection Problem
Some critics are concerned that expanding recognition to new families could increase fraud. Their worry is that more parties will selfidentify as families to claim government or employment benefits, or else
refuse to self-identify as families when recognition could impose obliga349
tions.
This problem has been acknowledged in determining social assis350
tance eligibility for unmarried conjugal couples in Canada. The likelihood of fraud, however, can be more or less extreme depending on the
351
model of protection adopted. Canada’s model is ascriptive. An ascriptive model nudges parties into adverse selection because the model assesses the family’s status at each point of offering a government benefit
or obligation, rather than in one permanent determination, according to
352
the conditions of eligibility for each government benefit. Thus, a couple could be considered a family for one benefits scheme but not a family for another. This encourages families to game the system in a manner
most strategic for them.
This drawback of the ascriptive model is not present in more formalist models of recognition such as registration or contracts. Under
those schemes, once parties have been recognized through a comprehensive approach, their status is fixed until dissolution. They cannot modify
their associated obligations in order to game the system.
The potential for fraud is therefore offset in cases where there is a
complete package of rights and obligations that flow from status

349. Bala, supra note 170 at 94 n.140.
350. Id. (“The adverse selection issue is already a problem with informal (i.e. non-marital)
conjugal relationships, for example in determining social assistance (in)eligibility,
though there will generally be more indicia and records available to help make this
determination than for non-conjugal relationships.”).
351. Christine Davies, The Extension of Martial Rights and Obligations to the Unmarried:
Registered Domestic Partnerships and Other Methods, 17 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 248, 256
(1999).
352. See Bala, supra note 170, at 94 n.140.
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recognition, including private law obligations of support, rather than
various rights and obligations assigned piecemeal. By contrast, any
benefit-by-benefit approach that attaches legal status for one purpose
only, such as the current ascriptive regime in Canada, presents a risk of
353
fraud. This is another reason to resist the ascriptive model.
Other versions of fraud—where individuals hold themselves out to
be a family when they are not—are still present under formal recognition models. But the danger of fraud in these contexts is no more or less
pronounced than the risk of fraudulent marriage—a problem that has
existed and been dealt with for as long as benefits have accrued to marital status.
Of course, courts know that there are several reasons aside from
romantic ones that may motivate a person’s decision to marry, such as
family approval or favorable tax laws, and that policing entry into mar354
riage is impossible. To that end there is an ongoing debate on how the
355
welfare system in the United States impacts people’s marital choices.
For instance, anecdotal findings suggest that the decision to get married
(as opposed to the decision to cohabitate but not marry) is profoundly
356
affected by the income tax penalty associated with marriage. Professors Whittington and Alm have extensively studied the issue, and have
shown that the greater the marriage tax penalty, the more pronounced

353. Id.
354. For an example in the United States, see United States v. Hall, 74 M.J. 525, 530
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014). For an example in Canada, see Nova Scotia (Attorney
Gen.) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, 355 (Can.).
355. See, e.g., Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, The Effects of Public Policy on Marital
Status in the United States, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 76 (Shoshana A.
Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003) (“The U.S. welfare system has probably generated
more controversy about how public policy affects human behavior than any other
program.”).
356. More often than not, married couples filing jointly receive a bonus: they pay less than
the sum of their taxes due if each had filed separately. Only occasionally, their joint
filing is more than the sum of the respective bills. This is known as the “marriage
penalty.” It occurs only when the married couple is composed of two income earners,
and only in the extreme situations where the double-earner family is particularly lowincome or high income. See Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The
Taxation of Women in Same-Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 332 (2016);
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 991 (1993); see generally BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE & URBAN INSTITUTE. Marriage Penalties and Bonuses, TAX POLICY
CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/topic/individual-taxes/marriage-penaltiesand-bonuses (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
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the impact on relationship decisions: an unmarried couple is less likely
357
to marry and a married couple is more likely to divorce.
U.S. v. Hall sets forth a test for fraud that requires proof of a specific illicit purpose, either in a marriage context or under a scheme that
recognizes new families:
It is not the absence of a perfect or ideal “love, honor,
and cherish” motivation of the parties that renders the
consequences . . . criminal; rather, it is the affirmative
presence of a singularly focused illicit one—an intent to
fraudulently acquire a government payment stream—that
358
does so.
Even with this test, however, some amount of fraudulent marriages
would likely continue to go undetected and, we can infer, so too with
359
new families. In this sense, fraud is a natural byproduct of the system.
5. The Transmogrification of the “Child’s Best Interest” Argument
Finally, scholars have argued that recognition of new families is
360
harmful to children’s best interests. For example, Professor Nicholas
Bala has expressed the concern that children can be reared only in a
normative, conjugal environment:
[W]hile society can no longer equate conjugality with
procreation, there is still a strong relationship between
conjugality and children. Conjugality is relevant to both
psychological and biological parenthood, and there are few
357. James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?,
48 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 570 (1995); James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or
Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297, 311 (1999);
James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Income Taxes and the Timing of Marital Decisions, 64 J. PUB. ECON. 219, 238 (1997).
358. Hall, 74 M.J. at 530.
359. LEG. COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION 14
(2001), available at https://www.sec.state.vt.us/media/689618/ReviewComm2002_
LC-01048.pdf.
360. See Mohammad Al-Sharfi, Karen Pfeffer, & Kirsty A. Miller, The effects of polygamy
on children and adolescents: a systematic review, 22 J. FAM. STUD. 272 (2016) (finding
“more mental health problems, social problems and lower academic achievement for
children and adolescents from polygynous than monogamous families.”); Bala, supra
note 170, at 97 (stating that “[t]he commitment inherent in a conjugal relationship
is . . . desirable in establishing an environment in which to raise children.”).
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people who would consider (as a first choice) raising a child
with a partner who was not in a conjugal relationship with
them. The commitment inherent in a conjugal relationship is
also desirable in establishing an environment in which to
361
raise children.”
But I believe that this argument overlooks two points. First, nonconjugal families can engage in responsible parenting as much as other
families. In February 2017, an Ontario court issued a declaration of parentage to Lynda Collins, the best friend and colleague of Natasha Bakht,
regarding Bakht’s biological son, Elaan, a profoundly disabled boy with
362
spastic quadriplegia. Collins had supported Elaan both financially and
emotionally since his birth, accompanying him to medical visits and
making crucial decisions about his health, welfare, and education with
363
his biological mother. The court was thus satisfied that it was in the
child’s best interest to recognize Collins as a “mother” and issued a declaration of parentage (vertical dimension), regardless of whether Collins
364
and Bakht were partnered (horizontal dimension). The court correctly
understood that conjugality is not an inherent feature of childrearing,
and that Elaan’s best interests were served by considerations of a number of factors—none of which involved the nature of the relationship
between Collins and Bakht.
Second, I believe this argument misses the mark, and confuses the
vertical and horizontal dimensions of familyhood. The socially-accepted,
state-subsidized notion of the nuclear family has, among other things,
effectively linked the worthiness of familyhood to the adults’ willingness
365
to raise children. This is what families are made for, the thinking goes,
and hence the will to raise children becomes a clue to the stability and
366
commitment of the (conjugal) family bond. Undoubtedly, the link

361. Id.
362. Julie Ireton, Raising Elaan: Profoundly Disabled Boy’s ‘Co-Mommas’ Make Legal History, CBCNEWS (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/multimedia/
raising-elaan-profoundly-disabled-boy-s-co-mommas-make-legal-history-1.3988464
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
363. Application for Declaration of Parentage, Collins v. Deputy Registrar Gen. (2016),
No. FC-16-862-0 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of J.).
364. Ireton, supra note 362.
365. See DAN CERE, COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND
THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 13 (2005) (“Another characteristic of
conjugal marriage is that it is fundamentally child-centered, focused beyond the couple towards the next generation.”).
366. For a snapshot of the arguments on the importance of marriage in child development, as well as some of the reasons to question it, see Martha Garrison, The Chang-
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between marriage and childrearing has ben altered as a result of the
same-sex marriage struggle, which stressed the functional and intention367
al attributes of parenthood over those rooted in biology —but one
could hardly submit that the link between marriage and childrearing has
368
weakened. Justice Roberts’ view in Obergefell—that “[m]arriage is a
socially arranged solution for the problem of getting people to stay to369
gether and care for children. . .” —still has a grip on our collective
consciousness.
But families are formed for lots of reasons, many of which have
370
nothing to do with children. Extending legal protections to committed adult relationships (horizontal) is a separate inquiry entirely.

367.
368.

369.

370.

ing Face of Marriage, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 9
(John Eekelaar & Rob George eds., 2014) (providing that research shows that
“[m]ost of the marital advantage can . . . be explained by partner characteristics that
precede family formation.”).
Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1185, 1213 (2016).
Same-sex couples fighting for the right to marry argued that they had the same capacity to love and raise children as opposite-sex couples, and that children could thrive
where love, not just heterosexuality, existed. See id. at 1241. To this effect, they did
not challenge the assumption that marriage is inherently child-centered. But see Chapter 4: Marriage and Parenting, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 13, 2013), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/06/13/chapter-4-marriage-and-parenting/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (presenting research which shows that LGBT respondents are far
less likely to say that “having children” is an important reason for getting married
(28%), as compared to non-LGBT respondents (49%)).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS
WEAKENED FAMILIES 41 (2002).).
POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 141 (“Adults build relationships for purposes other than
childrearing.”). Scholars have argued that the very notion of marriage is now torn between two competing visions. On the one side is the “conjugal model” of marriage (a
sexual union between a man and woman) that is essentially child-centered. See CERE,
supra note 365, at 7. On the other side is the “close relationship model” of marriage,
which sees marriage as “a private relationship between two people created primarily
to satisfy the needs of adults.” Id. Under the latter approach, even if children do arise
from the union they are not seen as an inherent or necessary part of the relationship.
Id. at 7–8. The close relationship model’s vision of marriage has received constitutional aegis in both Canada and the U.S. See Halpern v. Att’y Gen. of Canada,
[2003] O.J. No. 2268 (Can. Ont.); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 961–64 (2003). For a brief discussion of the Demographic Transition Theory,
see Dudley Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory, 50 POPULATION STUD. 361 (1996)
(arguing that a decline in birth in modern times derives from the fact that living
standards, medicine and technology improve mortality rates before—and quicker
than—they influence fertility). Kirk’s argument was deemed unsatisfactory by many
prominent feminist theorists. See e.g., Alison Mackinnon, Were Women Present at the
Demographic Transition? Questions from a Feminist Historian to Historical Demogra-
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The rationale for protecting families with dependent children is
wholly different from the rationale for protecting adult-adult horizontal
371
relationships. The two dimensions ought to be separated. I would
thus discard all objections based on childrearing and procreation as offtopic, deserving of special—and separate—consideration.
B. Reframing Political Action
1. The Unsuitability of Marriage
As I argued in the introductory note, queer activists and new families should not seek to pattern their political action after the marriage
equality movement. When considering legal options for protecting nonnormative family units, marriage is an unsuitable option. I do not argue
for the abolition of marriage, which would still be available to couples—
both gay and straight—who are willing to marry. I merely contend that
marriage is not well-suited to these non-normative relationships, and
would suggest that activists spend their energy elsewhere.
372
At present in the U.S. bigamy is a crime. Marriage between siblings or other close relatives—although defined by different degrees of
373
consanguinity from state to state —is also prohibited under incest
374
laws. Under the current legal framework in the U.S., some nonnormative dyadic couples such as friends or distant relatives could resort
to marriage to gain state protection. However, because they lack a sexual
component to their relationship, the couple would always face legal an-

371.
372.

373.

374.

phers, 7 GEND. & HISTORY 222, 224–25 (1995). For an overview of the psychological perspective on the declining birth rate, see e.g., Ellen Walker, Childfree Trend on
the Rise: Four Reasons Why!, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jan. 19, 2014), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/complete-without-kids/201401/childfree-trendthe-rise-four-reasons-why (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
See e.g. POLIKOFF, supra note 5, at 142–43 (noting the differing rationales for according public benefits to families).
See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1190, 1234 (D. Utah 2013) (upholding Utah’s prohibition of bigamy in the “literal sense” and striking down the cohabitation prong of the Utah criminal statute as contrary to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and due process under the Fourteenth AmendAmendment).
See, e.g., In re Estate of May, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953) (applying the “contrary to natural
law” exception to the applicability of the lex loci to a marriage contracted in Rhode
Island, and valid under the state law, between an uncle and a niece, then deceased in
New York, where such marriage was incestuous).
D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 180 (2016).
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nulment on grounds of marriage fraud, because the state could argue
375
that they married to get government benefits. Such a threat is not unheard of: Courts have deemed couples to be in fraudulent, spurious
376
marriages that were not entered into in good faith. These decisions
377
have arisen in the context of immigration proceedings, judicial inquir378
379
ies into a spousal evidentiary privilege, and housing allowances. In
these cases, the major test is whether the “couple intended to live together as husband and wife,” by which the court means that they engage
380
in a sexual relationship. The state of marriage laws is therefore clearly
inadequate to support new families, and even if they were radically updated, I believe that marriage would still not be the best solution.
To start, marriage has a vexed history of exclusion and discrimina381
tion. The recent struggles over extending marriage to same-sex couples have revealed some of these deep structural flaws. By removing
non-normative relationships from the marital space, we can side-step
many of the most hurtful and pitched battles over culture, religion, and
morality. Recognizing new families through a vehicle other than marriage can only help to make the process less controversial.
Furthermore, I believe that there are structural differences between
non-normative relationships and those relationships that have sought
recognition through marriage, namely conjugal couples.
First, new families are different from conjugal couples in many
respects: They may not yearn for social recognition or for assimilation

375. Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012) (referring not to
the contract-based doctrine of marriage frauds, which leads to the annulment of the
marriage, but to the different doctrines addressing “sham” marriages developed in
welfare law, social security law, and immigration law, in the twentieth century in the
United States.); cf. United States v. Bolden, 23 M.J. 852, 854 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987)
(“If the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world, they have never really agreed to be married at all.”).
376. Abrams, supra note 375, at 5.
377. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953) (holding that in the immigration
context of the case, “the common-law rule prohibiting anti-spousal testimony has no
application.”).
378. United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975).
379. United States v. Hall, 74 M.J. 525, 529 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2014).
380. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 614. The Obergefell decision modifies the definition in the sense
that the new definition of a non-fraudulent marriage is case in gender-neutral terms
(wife and wife or husband and husband) in addition to husband and wife. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
381. See generally BARRY supra note 23; Hamilton supra note 23; Herman supra note 23;
METZ supra note 22.
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382

into a heteronormative relationship. New families can be vastly
different from each other, such that the parties are sexually involved or
not, are related or not, are exclusive of other romantic partners or not,
383
and are economically interdependent or not. Marriage is simply not
built to accommodate such a diversity of family arrangements.
Second, given this heterogony, new families are unlikely to be able
to develop a group identity. This is distinct from same-sex couples, who
have successfully mobilized to form what political scientists and sociologists call “identity politics”—group political activism based on a sense of
384
collective, shared identity, rather than an interest. Such identity-based
claims are likely to be unserviceable for the many new family units.
Since new families are extremely diverse, it is unlikely that new families
385
feel they belong to an identifiable group, at least at present. Two elderly sisters who decide to seek legal recognition as a family unit in order to offer each other social security benefits are not likely to see themselves as fighting the same fight as a group of young people in a
386
polyamorous relationship. As indicated above, I believe the same issue
underlies the reason why non-conjugal families in Alberta seem to never
387
bring suit under AIRA, despite their inclusion under the law. The disappearance of non-traditional families (in those cases, non-conjugal
families) from the case law could be linked to a lack of awareness that
they constitute a family at all.
382. The ideal of the romantic, heteronormative, dyadic relationship has been central in
the critiques of the feminist, queer, and family law scholarship in the past decades.
See Goldberg, supra note 22 at 224; see generally METZ, supra note 22.
383. See Rosenbury, supra note 60, at 22930; BRENDA COSSMAN & BRUCE RYDER, THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF ADULT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: EVALUATING POLICY
OBJECTS AND LEGAL OPTIONS IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION 19394 (2000), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1740122.
384. See generally Mary Bernstein, Identity Politics, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 47 (2005).
385. Leckey, supra note 53, at 31 (“Other kinds of relationship potentially relevant to family policy—for example, people “living together apart,” persons with disabilities and
their caregivers—may have neither the group identity nor the desire to assimilate into
existing categories.”).
386. See infra Section II.B.
387. I have reached the same conclusion elsewhere, in my Ph.D. dissertation, upon examination of a similar New Brunswick scheme concerning spousal support. Under Article 112(3) of the Family Services Act, “Two persons, not being married to each other,
who have lived together (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years in a
family relationship in which one person has been substantially dependent upon the
other for support, or (b) in a family relationship of some permanence where there is a
child born of whom they are the natural parents, and have lived together in that relationship within the preceding year, have the same obligation as that set out in subsection (1) [an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other
spouse].” Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c F-2.2 (Can.).
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For the foregoing reasons, it is hard to foresee new families devel388
oping identity-based claims in the near future. The marriage equality
movement, while inspiring in its success, is therefore an unavailing
model for most non-normative families.
2. Proposed Remedies
I believe that the best way to provide legal recognition to new families will be via the contractual model, through legislation patterned generally after the proposed bills in Alabama (2015–2016 version) and Missouri—but without their narrow conditions of eligibility. Before the
introduction of same-sex marriage in the U.S., some legal scholars had
the intuition that it would have been preferable for same-sex couples to
keep civil marriage for heterosexual couples only, and to craft alternative
389
regimes for same-sex couples. However, they largely focused on civil
unions as the most viable alternative, mostly to elude the intense con390
flict sparked by the same-sex marriage debate. By contrast, I contend
that a designated beneficiary scheme, particularly the version offered by
Colorado, holds more potential for new families than traditional civil
unions.
Both proposals are formal models of recognition; unlike ascription,
both models require parties to take affirmative steps to have their union
recognized. I agree with the chorus of voices—including the Supreme
391
Court of Canada —that have argued that state recognition must be af392
firmatively chosen by the parties. I believe this is critical to protecting
the dignity and autonomy of the parties. And while this point applies to
all relationships, it acquires special significance in the field of nonnormative relationships, because their characteristics—which can in388. See generally Nausica Palazzo, Identity Politics e il Suo Reciproco: Riflessioni GiuridicoPolitiche Sull’attivismo Queer, in PROSPETTIVE INTERDISCIPLINARI SU FORMAZIONE,
UNIVERSITÀ, LAVORO, POLITICHE E MOVIMENTI SOCIALI 625 (Annalisa Murgia &
Barbara Poggio eds., 2017). Likewise, Professor Leckey argued that a lack of group
identity in these kinds of relationships could affect new families’ ability to assert their
rights though a conventional civil rights approach. See also Leckey, supra note 53, at
31.
389. Greg Johnson, Civil Union, A Reappraisal, 30 VERMONT L. REV. 891, 894 (2006);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case For Abolishing
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2006).
390. Johnson, supra note 389, at 894; Zelinsky, supra note 389, at 1162.
391. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at ¶ 161.
392. Nova Scotia (Attorney Gen.) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, 355 (Can.) (“Where the
legislation has the effect of dramatically altering the legal obligations of partners, as
between themselves, choice must be paramount.”).
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clude fluidity and romantic non-exclusivity—stand at odds with functional recognition. Practically speaking, new kinship unions are simply
harder for the state to identify than dyadic, conjugal unions.
One of the many benefits of both contractual and registration
schemes is their relative simplicity. Under a contractual scheme, such as
that in the proposed bills in Alabama and Missouri, parties need only
sign a civil contract declaring that they are in a marital-like relationship,
393
and then register it. Likewise, under the registration model, like the
designated beneficiary scheme in Colorado, participants need only fill
out a simple form, which can be completed without the assistance of an
394
attorney. In doing so, parties choose which prerogatives and rights to
395
assign and which to withhold, so the scheme is very flexible. Unfortunately, the system falls short of allowing parties to designate multiple
beneficiaries, which could be a problem if multiple caregiving relation396
ships co-exist. But this rigidity is partially offset by the opportunity
for new families to customize the bundle of rights and obligations that
come along with registration, albeit with respect to a single beneficiary.
The Colorado scheme has less narrow eligibility requirements than
the contracts proposed in Missouri and Alabama, so the scheme shifts
the focus away from a romanticized, sexual relationship by extending its
reach to relatives and friends who seek to be in a committed family
397
relationship. The law also excludes fidelity rights and duties and other
398
marital-like obligations from its scope.
I do not mean to disregard all the shortcomings associated with
these regimes, especially their excessive rigidity. While a proper opt-out
system in the case of registration can help parties tailor their bundle of
rights, duties, and benefits, neither system allows for the designation of
multiple beneficiaries or for the division of benefits. These flaws are correctable over time, however, and the process of recognizing new families
will likely come in waves. Both proposals strike a balance between the
need to recognize at least some new families and the states’ interests.

393. See infra Section I.C.
394. A sample beneficiary agreement can be found on the website of the City and County
of Denver. CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER, DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT
FORM, https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/777/documents/
MarriageCivilUnions/Designated%20Beneficiary%20Agreement.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2018).
395. Id.
396. See supra Section I.C.2.
397. See supra Section I. A.1, 3.
398. See supra Figure 1.
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3. The Strange Pairing: Notes on Forming Alliances
Queer activists and radical pluralist movements have fought
marriage in the past as an undesirable tool for protecting non-normative
399
However, the liberationist stances held by queer
relationships.
activists—opposing marriage on several grounds and even sometimes
advocating for its abolition—have fallen short of advocating for the
introduction of alternatives to marriage such as a designated or
400
reciprocal beneficiary scheme.
Non-normative family structures are on the rise, and the reforms
outlined above are all viable legal paths to pursuing recognition of new
401
families and accommodating family pluralism. But in order to succeed, queer activists and new families should form strategic alliances
with the conservative fringe groups that have shown an interest in ex402
ploring alternative regimes to marriage.
It is highly likely that the motivation behind bills like those in
Missouri and Alabama was to preserve the socially conservative idea of
marriage as between one man and one woman. Queer activists would be

399. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 26, 29, 30.
400. Id.; Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 69495.
401. The last available census in Canada is illustrative of the changing landscape of families in the country. The Vanier Institute, which processed the census data, noticed
that only 66% of families in Canada include a married couple (while 18% live in a
common-law marriage and 16% are lone-parent families), and also that family structures continuously evolve by achieving an unprecedented degree of complexity.
NATHAN BATTAMS, THE VANIER INSTITUTE OF THE FAMILY, A SNAPSHOT OF FAMILY
DIVERSITY IN CANADA (2018). While in 2010 only 5.9% of couples were in a nonmarital conjugal union, these couples now account for one fifth of all conjugal (dyadic) couples in the country. STATISTICS CANADA, FAMILIES, HOUSEHOLDS AND
MARITAL STATUS: KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2016 CENSUS, 1, 4 (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/170802/dq170802a-eng.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2018). The Institute also noticed that in 2016, 404,000 multigenerational households in Canada were registered, and that multi-generational families were the fastest-growing household type since 2001 (+38%). Likewise, in other
Western countries, the emergency of non-normative families acts in tandem with the
decline of marriage. JAY TEACHMAN ET. AL., The Demography of Families, in
HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 1, 39 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the decline of marriage in the United States); Claire Miller, Number of People Getting Married Is Falling — and Here’s the Reason Why, THE MIRROR (Apr. 27, 2016) https://
www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/sex-relationships/number-people-getting-married-falling7844282 (referring to the decline of marriage in England and Wales).
402. Some activists proposed as much in the context of the same-sex marriage debate. See
Jeffrey A. Redding, Queer/Religious Potentials in U.S. Same-Sex Marriage Debates, in
QUEER THEORY: LAW, CULTURE, EMPIRE, 131 (Kimberley Brooks & Robert Leckey
eds., 2010).
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right to be hurt by such legislation, but it is in their interest to look
beyond the motivation of the law to its possibly beneficial effects. When
conservative groups bend so far to the right to protect traditional
marriage, they unconsciously pursue some progressive objectives which
are consistent with those on the left. For those who believe that
marriage poses a threat to non-normative families, alternate schemes—
403
even those generated out of animus—have promise.
This unusual convergence of interests between radical-pluralist activists and conservatives has been pointed out in reference to certain Al404
abama judges’ refusal to issue marriage licenses to gay couples. In that
instance, one journalist noted the “strange pairing” of conservative
405
groups and non-normative families. The intuition is on point. The
conservative interest in protecting different familial arrangements alongside marriage is not different from the progressive desire to protect other
non-normative families—only the motivations differ.
Importantly, however, it is also likely that alliances aimed at furthering the interests of non-normative conjugal couples would be complicated to form. Conservative groups maintain a strong opposition toward marriage-like relationships that defy the traditional notion of the
406
nuclear family. This is not to say that such alliances are impossible,

403. If queer activists believe that marriage poses a serious threat to the freedom to decide
the aspects one’s familyhood, then they should be interested in schemes that pose a
lesser threat to it. Of course, I do not contend that registration and contracts fully
avoid normalization—what has been described as the “channelling [sic] function of
family law.” Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 503 (1992). Extending civil statuses always entails the risk of
legal labels reducing the “variety and pluralism of kinship practices.” Swennen &
Croce, supra note 143, at 54950. However, under either contract-based systems or
registration systems with strong opt-out options, it is the parties themselves who become the “source[s] of their own classification[s].” Id. at 552.
404. Shane Ferro, How Today’s Supreme Court Ruling Brought Uber Conservatives and Radical Queers Together, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 26, 2015), https://
www.businessinsider.com/gay-marriage-ruling-brought-conservatives-and-radicalqueers-together-2015-6.
405. Id.
406. The reaction of social conservatives to same-sex marriage is one example of this opposition—another is their reaction to extending marriage to polygamous unions. For
one example of a conservative Justice’s resistance to plural marriages in constitutional
doctrine, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 2584, 2621 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal
force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage.”). These slippery-slope
arguments can also slide into hurtful attacks. See FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
SLIPPERY SLOPE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2004) (“Once marriage is no longer confined to a man and a woman, it is impossible to exclude virtually any relationship between two or more partners of either sex—even non-human ‘partners.’”).
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but rather that the difference between the two parties will manifest in
the details of a recognition scheme. I argue that the two groups could
still find common ground on the point of introducing alternative regimes to marriage, as long as marriage as a traditional institution was
maintained.
I believe that for any such alliance to work, the queer activists
would need to concede that marriage is not the goal for non-normative
families. Radical pluralist movements and queer activists should emphasize case law that entrenches marriage as a traditional and privileged institution—an institution that the state has a legitimate interest in fur407
thering—in order to build such a broad coalition. Same-sex marriage
advocacy has been central to entrenching the view that marriage alone
408
can confer expressive benefits. In the U.S., for instance, before the
Supreme Court issued the Obergefell decision, marriage equality advocates succeeded in striking down alternative regimes to marriage under a
separate-but-equal narrative claiming that these statuses fell short of
409
conveying the dignity and respect that only marriage confers.
Therefore, it is crucial for queer activists pushing for the introduction of alternative regimes to marriage to communicate the following to
other movements and to society at large:
(i) marriage ought to be preserved as a traditional institution;
(ii) alternative regimes to marriage are the most suitable
vehicle to protect new families; and
(iii) such alternative regimes are not second-class to
marriage.
As to the first point, one could wonder what the interest of conservative groups is in preserving marriage now that Obergefell has made

407. North Dakota Fair Hous. Council v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551 (N.D. 2001) (rejecting the contention that the state code prohibiting discrimination in housing applied to unmarried couples); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah
2013), vacated, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Utah criminal law on bigamy, while rejecting the religious cohabitation prong of
the statute); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (1976) (“Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out that the structure of society itself
largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this
opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution.”).
408. See generally Obergefell, 576 U.S. 2584.
409. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008) (holding that exclusion
from marriage amounted to a violation of the same-sex couples’ human dignity).
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410

same-sex marriage available nation-wide. I believe that polyamorous
relationships are the next frontier in family law. It is not inconceivable
411
that they will enter into a similar marriage equality “war” soon.
Hence, the two groups could coalesce around those aspects that appeared to be sticking points in the marriage debate, such as preserving
the label “marriage” for a limited array of relationships (thereby excluding polyamorous relationships from the institution) or, less radically,
preserving the symbolic benefits of marriage, and its place in culture and
society (yet not in public and private family law) as an archetypal institution with transcendent meaning.
As to the second point, alternative regimes could be better for the
parties in several respects. They could accommodate family pluralism in
ways that marriage is structurally unable to do. They avoid some of the
costs of assimilation, which are at their zenith in marital arrangements.
412
They can build in more flexibility.
This might sound like a difficult needle to thread. I am not arguing
that queer activists simultaneously must convince conservatives that
marriage is the best option, and then convince new families/progressive
activists that marriage is not the best option. I operate from the presumption that social conservatives already believe that marriage has a
special place is society and that it ought to be preserved as a traditional
institution. Rather, I suggest that queer activists capitalize on many new
families reduced interest in marriage per se. What I advocate is a trade:
conservatives get to preserve traditional marriage for conjugal couples in
exchange for the creation of alternative regimes for new families.
The third point is most crucial, since under the current constitutional doctrine, alternative regimes would always be at risk of being
410. Carl Tobias, Implementing Marriage Equality in America, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 25,
44 (2015) (“[A] half year after the Justices issued Obergefell, practically every state and
most local governments have fully implemented the Court’s mandate, even across
much of the South, which initially appeared most resistant. Few localities have experienced resistance and for only a brief period.”).
411. See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW, CLARENDON LAW
SERIES 3031 (2001); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 283 (2005);
Christian Klesse, Marriage, Law and Polyamory: Rebutting Mononormativity with Sexual Orientation Discourse?, 6 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1348 (2016); Joanna L.
Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Is Three Still a Crowd? Polygamy and the Law
After Obergefell v. Hodges, VERDICT, (July 7, 2015) https://verdict.justia.com/2015/
07/07/is-three-still-a-crowd-polygamy-and-the-law-after-obergefell-v-hodges; see generally RONALD C. DEN OTTER, BEYOND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PERSPECTIVES ON
MARITAL POSSIBILITIES (2016) (providing diverse perspectives on the possibilities for
marriage after the legalization of same-sex marriage).
412. See supra Section II.A.3.
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struck down in violation of a state constitution’s equal protection clause.
However, I believe there are defenses. When courts have struck these
sorts of regimes in the past (such as domestic partnerships or civil unions), they have looked at the inequality of the system relative to mar413
riage. In doing so they took into account the individuals’ feelings of
414
social inferiority and rejection. A well-designed alternative scheme
could avoid feelings of social inferiority by providing new families with
a robust scheme of protections. The idea that new families risk experiencing feelings of social inferiority overlooks the fact that they might see
material benefits, rather than dignitary benefits, as the ultimate goal.
This has been the case in the context of LGBT activism in Europe and
415
the United States.
It is also important to note that the second-class status concern
originated in contexts where domestic partnerships and civil unions
were identical to marriage in terms of the benefits, rights and obligations
416
set forth under state law. They were not genuine alternatives; rather,
they were functionally equivalent regimes that lacked only the label of
marriage. This explains the feeling of discrimination and social
inferiority on the part of same-sex couples. By contrast, truly alternative
schemes would provide a different bundle of rights and obligations,
would set different (hopefully much lighter) rules to police entrance and
417
exit, and most of all, would not be limited to conjugal couples alone.
413. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
414. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,
226– 27 (2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that:
[b]y excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the [s]tate declares
that it is legitimate to differentiate between their commitments and the
commitments of heterosexual couples. Ultimately, the message is that
what same-sex couples have is not as important or as significant as “real”
marriage, that such lesser relationships cannot have the name of marriage.).
415. See Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 109
(2010) (“In fact, it seems that the lesson that the theory of small change misses is that
many European LGB organizations object to same-sex marriage and are more interested in securing partnership rights for same-sex couples.”) (emphasis added); KATHERINE
FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY: HOW AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND GAYS MIISTAKENLY THOUGHT THE RIGHT TO MARRY WOULD SET
THEM FREE 144-45 (2015).
416. Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two Strategies in the Struggle for
Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567, 587
(2009).
417. For examples of alternative regimes that are open to both same-sex and cross-sex couples, see EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW VOLUME II 2 n.2 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2016).
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Conclusion
The conservative response to the movement for marriage equality
for LGBT couples has led to development of new legal alternatives to
418
marriage. The beneficiary schemes in Vermont and Hawaii were originally introduced by conservative groups (or as a compromise with con419
servative groups) in response to the gay marriage equality struggle.
The AIRA in Alberta, Canada, a hybrid ascriptive and registration system, was also pushed forward by Christian and conservative move420
421
ments. Recently, the socially conservative groups who resisted implementing same-sex marriage have pushed forward proposals for
alternate regimes in Alabama, Oklahoma, and Missouri. In bending so
far to the right, these groups have—ironically and unwittingly—reached
solutions that are consistent with queer activists’ interest in radical pluralist family arrangements. I contend that these initiatives did more than
enrich the menu of available options for protecting new families. They
have also become some of the most viable options for protecting these
families. In particular, I believe that new families and queer activists
should pursue reforms patterned after the designated beneficiary scheme
in Colorado or the proposed bills in Alabama and Missouri.
These movements are animated by hurtful notions, but they are
headed in the right direction. New families and queer advocates should

418. See supra Section II.
419. In Hawaii, the introduction of a reciprocal benficiary scheme was a tactic used by
conservatives to avoid the introduction of a partnership or marriage law for same-sex
couples. See Coleman, supra note 205. Democrats themselves were persuaded that
marriage ought to be a union of a man and a woman, and yet that some protections
should have been afforded to same-sex families. For instance, the co-chairman of the
Hawaii Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Avery B. Chumbley, explained, “On
Wednesday, I agreed to support a constitutional amendment which would reserve
marriage to opposite sex couples. I also agreed to support establishing reciprocal
beneficiary relationships with certain governmental rights and benefits.” Senator
Avery B. Chumbley, Same-Sex Marriage and Reciprocal Benefits, ALOHA, http://
www.aloha.net/~abc/samesex.html; see also JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM,
AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 124
(2005).
420. For instance, the most prominent moral conservative party supporting the reform was
the Reform/Alliance Party. See LOIS HARDER, AFTER THE NUCLEAR AGE? SOME
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILIES AND FAMILY LAW IN CANADA 9 (The
Vanier Institute for the Family 2011), http://vanierinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/
2015/12/CFT_2011-10-00_EN.pdf.
421. Such as the Christian movements in Alberta behind the introduction of AIRA, S.A.
2002, and the conservative movements behind the bills in Oklahoma, Alabama, and
Missouri. See Section II.C.
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aim to build alliances with conservative groups and find common
ground to introduce such alternative regimes. In doing so, they should
capitalize on their shared interest in alternatives to marriage, and on
those aspects that appeared to be sticking points in the marriage debate,
such as preserving marriage as a traditional institution and preserving
the label of “marriage” for conjugal couples only.
I predict that polyamorous relationships are the next frontier of
family law in the U.S. and Canada. That means that now is the time to
decide what legal regimes we need. “Defending” marriage as a dyadic
institution is a concession that queer activists should be willing to make
in order to introduce more flexible and ideologically-neutral regimes.
With formal recognition, new families could finally emerge in the
eyes of the law. They could gain material benefits and reduced social
stigma. This achievement would allow queer activists to fully challenge
current narrow notions of who is deserving of state recognition. Formal
recognition is a worthy goal for queer activists in the U.S. and Canada,
and it would finally align family law with the diverse reality of love and
commitment in the modern day.

